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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
IRAN AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION AND THE
IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by
Farshad Ghodoosi
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
The sweeping changes in the Middle East, so-called the “Arab Spring”, necessitate
revisiting constitutionalism in the region. This task entails a fresh look at the idea of rule
of law and constitutionalism amongst the people of the Middle East. One of the widely
misconceived and yet understudied constitutional movements in the Middle East belongs
to Iran. A new perspective on the trajectory of constitutionalism in Iran would better
equip us to comprehend rule of law in the Middle East. From the 1905 Constitutional
movement to the 1979 Revolution, Iran has undergone major changes. Each
transformation created a rupture with the preceding order fostering a fresh look at rule of
law in Iran. The current studies have mainly concentrated on the political and social
aspects of these groundbreaking events. The legal aspect of each of event has remained
largely unnoticed and under-researched.
It is important to fill the gap by focusing on the role of constitutions, despite its
shortcomings, and international commitments of states using Iran as an example. The

iii

objective is to bring to the fore the role constitutionalism plays in incentivizing states to
enter into international commitments and to comply with their international
commitments. More than before, the mutual relationship between constitutionalism and
international relations is intertwined because of two main developments: a. for better or
worse, international relations have become increasingly judicialized, meaning all aspects
of inter-state interactions are now subject to some normative regimes; b. more than ever,
states feel the need to structure their domestic and inter-state relationship by resorting to a
normative structure which is best materialized in constitutions.
Using Iran as an example, this dissertation aims to fulfill the following: First, it is critical
to understand whether a state is a constitutional state and whether its domestic power
relations are subject to any checks and balances (broadly speaking). By reviewing Iran’s
recent history through this lens, the dissertation shows that Iranian’s legal culture
presents (a version of) constitutionalism.
Second, it is critical to understand whether constitutionalism leads to any differences in
the international behavior of such a state.

Based on its constitutionalism, Iran’s

international behavior has been premised on legalistic and juridical grounds.

iv
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INTRODUCTION

Constitutions are the most important legal as well as political documents in the majority
of states. Following mass atrocities of the 20th century, constitutions have been viewed
as documents that can protect certain minimal civil and political rights and regulate the
power dynamics within a polity. In the inter-state relationship, constitutions have served
as a signal to demonstrate ‘statehood’ and to establish autonomy. Despite its importance,
constitutions and in particular constitutionalism, have not been analyzed in international
relations and international law.
International relations as a field has been primarily preoccupied with ‘order’ or lack
thereof in the international arena, role of material power, and liberal values such as
democracy. International law as a field, on the other hand, has viewed constitutions as
either determinant of ‘decision-makers’ in each political system or a domestic law
instrument that could play a role in international law disputes. There is little discussion
on the inter-play between constitutionalism on the one hand and international relations.
It is important to fill the gap by focusing on the role of constitutions, despite its
shortcomings, and international commitments of states using Iran as an example. The
objective is to bring to the fore the role constitutionalism plays in incentivizing states to
enter into international commitments and to comply with their international
commitments. More than before, the mutual relationship between constitutionalism and
international relations is intertwined because of two main developments: a. for better or
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worse, international relations have become increasingly judicialized, meaning all aspects
of inter-state interactions are now subject to some normative regimes; b. more than ever,
states feel the need to structure their domestic and inter-state relationship by resorting to a
normative structure which is best materialized in constitutions.
Using Iran as an example, this dissertation aims to fulfill the following: First, it is critical
to understand whether a state is a constitutional state and whether its domestic power
relations are subject to any checks and balances (broadly speaking). By reviewing Iran’s
recent history through this lens, the dissertation shows that Iranian’s legal culture
presents (a version of) constitutionalism.
Second, it is critical to understand whether constitutionalism leads to any differences in
the international behavior of such a state.

Based on its constitutionalism, Iran’s

international behavior has been premised on legalistic and juridical grounds.
As will be discussed below, the formation of Iran’s Constitution and its underlying
historical development paved the way for a binary “power struggle” between the
presidency and the supreme leader position. Unlike judicial checks and balances that
create and safeguard constitutional norms, Iran’s judiciary has rarely played a significant
role in solidifying the constitutional norms. On the other hand, however, due to a rift
created in the Constitution this role has been primarily vested and exercised by this rift
with the president being the advocate for the Constitution and the constitutional norms.
This is further reinforced by an ingrained legalistic culture in Iran based on pre-Islamic
Zoroastrianism as well as Shiite jurisprudence.

2

For example, one of the ingrained and highly cited principles under Shiite jurisprudence
is that one should abide by one’s legal commitments. 1 The notion of honor based on
keeping one’s promise is also important in Iranian culture. Iranian “cultural milieu” has
in its roots the idea that “one keeps promises and expects others, especially those known
to have great public status and claims of greatness to ‘do the right thing’, ‘be honorable’,
‘upright’, and ‘a man of your word’; a ‘pre-liberal’ culture of ‘honor’ and ‘chivalry’,
especially when promises and signals of good intentions and reciprocity are made, either
in public, or clearly in private.”2
Historical examples also demonstrate us that constitutions played a pivotal role in the
legitimization and/or de-legitimization of governments. A few notable examples are:
1) Iran is home to the first Constitutionalist movement in the region. From 1905-1911,
Iran underwent an uprising with the main message of making the long tradition of
monarchy in Iran constitutional. Establishing the rule of law and constitutionalism were
indeed the main demands of the people:
“Inspired by Western ideas, it believed that the country could rapidly progress if the
arbitrary will of kings was replaced with the predictable rule of laws, the power of
dynasties with the authority of elected representatives, the traditional art of communal

1

The Principle of Binding Nature of Contracts, available at http://wikifeqh.ir/لزوم_قاعده

2

Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Trust and U.S.-Iran Relations: Between the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the
Assurance Game, 4 IRANIAN REV. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 7, 31 (2013).

3

manipulation with the modern science of social engineering. In short, the intelligentsia
wanted to supplant Oriental despotism with Western constitutionalism.” 3
2) Constitutional values for which the Constitutional Revolution was fought soon were
undermined by the monarchy of Reza Pahlavi. 4 Once again with the rise of a democratic
government in the 1950s (albeit short-lived), values of the constitution and rule of law
were emphasized. Mohammad Mosadegh who became the Prime Minister of Iran from
1951-1953 in a democratically elected process tried to revive the constitutional values.
As noted by the Iranian historian, Ervand Abrahamian, “Mosadegh in his speeches from
1320 [1940-1941] until his battle for nationalization of oil, was more preoccupied with
increase of people’s participation in politics, reform of election process, and the role of
King in the politics.”5
3) During its battle with the Shah, Khomeini invoked the 1906 Iranian Constitution—
which was enacted as a result of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution—to delegitimize
Shah’s governance and government. Khomeini was fond of a provision in the 1906
Constitution allowing for religion clerics to review laws based on their correspondence
3

Ervand Abrahamian, The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, 10 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE
EAST STUDIES 381, 412 (1979)

4

Arguably Reza Pahlavi’s government was not unconstitutional. “Analytically, Reza Shah’s rule in
1920’s although growingly dictatorial, was not yet unconstitutional. The point is fine, though very
important, and so it needs a short explanation. Any dictatorship was certainly contrary to the
constitution of 1906 and its supplements, as it was a basically democratic constitution. On the
other hand, constitutional – as opposed to arbitrary – rule does not necessarily have to be
democratic. Therefore, authoritarian or dictatorial governments, although obviously undemocratic,
are not unconstitutional…This is what Reza Sha;s rule looked like at the beginning…” HOMA
KATOUZIAN, STATE AND SOCIETY IN IRAN: THE ECLIPSE OF THE QAJARS AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE PAHLAVIS 314 (2006).

5

Yervand Abrahamian, Mosadegh valued constitutionalization of Monarchy as much as he valued
nationalization
of
oil,
24
March
2012
available
at
http://tarikhirani.ir/fa/news/30/bodyView/1981/یرواند.آبراهامیان:.مصدق.مشروطه.شدن.سلطنت.را.همچون.ملی
.کردن.نفت.مهم.می%E2%80%8Cدانست.html
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with Islamic laws.6 But, Khomeini also used the 1906 constitution to attack the Shah’s
Government for its non-compliance with the constitution including for personal freedom.
Khomeini once said in one of his speeches addressing Shah: “if you are relying on the
constitution, the constitution is saying that you should free the people. . . it prohibits from
cruelty. We say you should abide by the constitution. . .the constitution has freedom of
press, will you allow the press to be free? Is it us who are reactionary in that we say you
should abide by the constitution.” 7
Historically, the ruling class and even the judiciary often flouted the texts of the
constitutions. But it was always viewed as aberrant from the norm to do so. It is often
referenced in the political discourse that certain behavior is against the constitution. For
example, Mohammad Khatami in 2001 warned the head of Iran’s judiciary that by trying
members of parliament it was violating the constitution.
asserted that

He issued a warning and

“I stated to the judiciary chief that the president, according to the

Constitution, is the second supreme official of the country. . .I announced that the

6

One of the hallmarks of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran was the execution of the renowned
and prominent clergy, Sheihk Fazlolah Noori by the revolutionaries. He was one of the opponents
of the Revolution asserting that the laws of the land should be compatible with Islamic Law. He
suggested that a group of jurists scrutinize the laws passed by the parliament to ensure that they
conform to Islamic rules and standards. Despite the execution of Fazlolah Noori, his idea entered
the Constitution as an amendment. More than 50 years later, this idea was reincarnated in the idea
of the Guardian Council in the 1979 Iranian Constitution in emulation of Conseil Constitutionnel
from the French Constitution of the fifth republic. This provision, along with Article 4 (Islamic
Supremacy Clause) and Article 5 (Clergy’s Guardianship) of the Constitution became the
landmarks of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution.

7

What was Imam Khomeini’s opinions regarding the 1906 constitution? Imamkhomeini.ir available
at http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/n20644/بود؟_چه_مشروطه_اساسی_قانون_ی_درباره_خمینی_امام_دیدگاه

5

president, besides being the head of state, is responsible for the execution of the
Constitution.”8
The focus of this dissertation as it will be explained is the post-1979 Revolution, the
period in which the new constitution and constitutionalism were being formed and
developed. The impact of such constitutionalism can be traced in Iran’s approach to its
international commitments.

Research Methodology

In order to conduct the underlying research for this dissertation, I used the primary
sources available in Iran, online, and at major universities in the United States:
•

During several trips to Iran between 2014-2015 I reviewed and collected legal

sources discussing the Iranian Constitution. Even though major Iranian professors such as
Dr. Nasser Katouzian have written on the Iran’s constitution, the literature in Farsi on
constitutionalism—the impact of the constitution in Iran’s legal culture—is sparse. This
is further reinforced by the fact that courts typically do not invoke the Iranian
Constitution in their dispute resolution function—unlike other countries such as the
United States—and Iran does not have a Constitutional court. Lawyers and legal
academics, therefore, do not put the focus on of their discussion on Iran’s Constitution.

8

Khatami Defends Own Constitutional Right, UPI, 23 October 2011 available
https://www.upi.com/Khatami-defends-own-constitutional-rights/39511003878537/

6

at

•

I also reviewed and collected sources at major U.S. universities. I visited the Farsi

sources at Yale University from 2013-2014 and Stanford University during the summer
of 2014.
•

I also consulted online sources available on the topic, most importantly, the

detailed discussion of the Assembly of Experts which ultimately finalized and proposed
the Iranian Constitution for referendum. 9
•

I also interviewed Iranian historians such as Dr. Abbas Milani at Stanford

University, U.S. constitutional scholars such as Yale’s Bruce Ackerman. (Mr. Ackerman
later supervised the constitutional aspect of the project) and experts on rule of law such as
Stanford’s Erik Jensen.
•

I presented this topic (and related topics) at several conferences including Yale

Law and Religion Debate Series and Stanford Law and Society in 2016.

9

See Detail Discussion on Final Review of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, available at
http://www.majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/MashroheMozakerat.html
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I. Theoretical Framework

A. Role of Constitutions
Constitutions are generally perceived as the most important legal document for a polity.
The functions and roles of a constitution are manifold. The constitution aims to
coordinate (and limit) the power struggle between various leadership positions of the
ruling body (horizontal function). In other words, it constrains the power and authority of
those who are in power vis-à-vis each other. It also aims to regulate the relationship
between the rulers and citizens of a certain polity (vertical function). The horizontal
function concerns the institutions of a certain polity and their respective structures and
duties. For instance, it establishes governmental institutions such as legislature,
executives, and the judiciary and defines their respective scope of authority and
procedures. The vertical function sets the role of citizens, their rights, and methods of
participation in the polity. Through this function, the constitution delineates the scope of

8

citizen participation in a polity through elections or other means. It also lays out the
individual rights of citizens in the polity and in relation to the government and the abuse
of power.
Constitutions also promise to offer normative functions as well. As the founding
document, constitutions provide foundational norms by which “other lower-order legal
norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and interpreted.” 10 These foundational
norms are purported to generate other norms in a certain polity. Through the normgenerative function, three goals are achieved: 1) constitutions reduce the collective action
problem 2) constitutions provide predictability and reliance 3) constitutions create a sense
of identity and continuity. Through establishing fundamental norms, constitutions aim to
alleviate the problem of free riding in a political order by constraining the self-interest
and interest-driven objectives of political actors. 11 Constitutions also create predictability
in political orders by creating a hierarchical structure by which officials can interact with
each other and states can enter into international relations. The leaders that represent
states emerge as a result of a normative and hierarchical structure generated by
constitutions and/or other similar foundational documents. Lastly, and more importantly
for our discussion, constitutions create a sense of “belonging” to a certain polity.
Disagreements about the nature and scope of constitutions exist. 12 Yet, constitutions aim

10

Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 626 (2009).

11

Alec Stone Sweet, What is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in International Relations
Theory, 56 THE REV. OF POLITICS, 441, 443 (1994).

12

“Not only is the list of fundamental constitutional norms open to debate, but the very identity of
“the Constitution”—the body of textual and historical materials from which the norms are to be
extracted and by which their application is to be guided—is itself a matter that cannot be

9

to create an identity (or several close identities) to which most of the political actors and
citizens relate. The identity comes to fruition despite disagreements amongst actors and
citizens. 13 In summary, using the language of Noah Feldman, constitutions provide
“grand philosophical principles that underlie the very existence of the political order.”14
Or, to put it differently, constitutions have the potential to offer a set of narratives
through which different actors—both inside and outside of the political order—relate to
the polity.
B. Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism has become one of the evasive notions in the legal and political
literature. This term has gained further popularity particularly in conjunction with the
“global constitutionalism” agenda put forward by a group of scholars. 15 Alec Stone Sweet
defines constitutionalism as “…the commitment on the part of any given political

objectively deduced or passively discerned in a viewpoint-free way.” Lawrence Tribe, A
Constitution We are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 443,
440 (1983).
13

“…constitutional disharmony is critical to the development of constitutional identity, even as it
may take more challenging task of establishing the specific substance of that identity at any given
point in time.”, GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 4 (2010)

14

Noah Feldman, Islamic Constitutionalism in Context: A Typology and a Warning, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L. J. 436, 443 (2010).

15

The term global constitutionalism is also vague. Some define it as emergence of constitutional law
methodology and approaches in international law, Anne Peters, The Merits of Global
Constitutionalism. 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD, 397, 397 (2009). Other refer to the unification
of constitutional practice and drafting in today’s world, David Law & Mila Versteeg, The
Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (2011). Yale
Law School has a Global Constitutionalism Seminar in order to “create an international rule of
law,
in
which
justice
can
flourish
in
peace.”,
http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/globalconstitutionalismseminar.htm.
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community to be governed by constitutional rules and principles.” 16 Bruce Ackerman has
a simpler approach. He defines constitutionalism as actual (not merely based on the
wording of the constitution) constraints of power relations in a state. 17 Moreover,
Ackerman posits that constitutions present a legitimacy narrative to the authority of
states. Weber famously asserted that authority gains legitimacy through one or more of
the following factors: tradition, charisma, or bureaucratic rationality. Ackerman’s goal is
to add a more relevant and important item to the list. In today’s world, constitutions grant
legitimacy to a political order. 18 The perception of actors in a certain political order
regarding the legitimacy narrative is paramount in the political life of that polity. In the
language of Ackerman, “the presence or absence of a widespread belief in constitutional
legitimacy can play an important—sometimes, all-important—role in shaping political
life.”19
As a result, constitutionalism has two major components:
1) paradigmatic element;
2) practical element.
With the first factor, I refer to the normative function of a constitution in a certain polity
by which citizens’ and political actors’ ideas about the polity converge (or even diverge)
as a result of constitutional norms. This is a mental and belief-based element that can

16

Stone Sweet, supra note 10 at 626.

17

World Constitutionalism, Manuscript is with the author

18

Id.

19

Id. at 4.
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guide us to the viability of constitutionalism in a certain polity. For instance, lack of
reference or debate regarding the constitution can demonstrate weak constitutionalism. In
other words, even strong disagreement on certain issues of the constitution by political
actors and citizens shows a level of constitutionalism in a political order. The other
element of constitutionalism is the practical factor. With this factor, I refer to the actual
and historical facts showing that the constitution has limited the authority of those who
govern. This shows that the constitution is more than a piece of paper in the polity under
study. Not only do actors refer to the constitution in the political culture and paradigm but
they are also constrained by its institutional and legal design.
It is crucial that we draw a distinction between constitutionalism and the rule of law and
democracy. The discussion of rule of law briefly investigates the existence of positive
laws in each legal system, their ubiquitous application and citizens’ compliance with it.
Constitutionalism, on the other hand, probes into the constraints that exist for people in
power. An example can illuminate this idea: Imagine a person who holds a political post,
let’s say the secretary of state, commits a gruesome act of domestic violence against his
spouse. In this case, the gauge for the rule of law is to observe whether the law applies to
the accused person as it is applied to other citizens. In the same scenario, if the parliament
impeaches the same person due to his domestic violence accusations, we are confronting
an element of constitutionalism. The rule of law and constitutionalism are inevitably

12

intertwined.20 Yet, the distinction is critical in understating different levels of constraints
imposed by law especially in the context of developing countries.
Constitutionalism is also invariably different from a democracy. At the expense of oversimplification, democracy can be defined as a method of government by which citizens
select the ruling elites through an electoral process. 21 Constitutionalism, however, refers
to the adherence of most political actors and citizens to the political order as designed by
the constitution. A democratic government can be a result of constitutionalism and
constitutionalism can ensue a democratic movement. Yet, these two notions are
independent.
C. Judicialization of International Relations
The scene of international relations is changing. The most important factor that is shaping
the change in our contemporary world is the “judicialization” of international relations.
The traditional view in international relations, the so-called realist view, emphasizes the
importance of the hard power of states in the anarchical setting of international
relations. 22 In summary, in an international setting with no centralized government,

20

“Constitutionalism is also premised on the rule of law as opposed to the rules of everyday men and
women. A constitution places a higher law above the policies and practices of transient leaders or
ruling majorities, and it requires that they abide by that constitutional higher law.” JAMES CURRY
ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 6 (2003).

21

For instance, we can look at the definition of Lipset and Lakin which is inspired by Joseph
Schumpeter, “The minimal definition of democracy we prefer is an institutional arrangement in
which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for
their chief executive and national legislature.”, SEYMOUR LIPSET & JASON LAKIN, THE
DEMOCRATIC CENTURY 19 (2004).

22

The founding fathers of classical realism in international relations are E.H. Carr and Hans
Morgenthau. See generally HANS MORGENTHAU AND KENNETH THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS (McGraw-Hill, 6th ed.1985) (1948)” E.H. C ARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 19191939, 166 (Palgrave 2001) (1964); Realism has brought into a new level and has been

13

survival becomes the main objective of states; a concern that could merely be alleviated
by having strong, hard and militarized power. 23 For realists, therefore, no real legal
constraints exist at the international level and states do not hesitate to break their legal
arrangements countering their interests. 24
Yet, the increasing judicialization of international relations as well as the unprecedented
level of legal arrangements in bilateral or multilateral forms between states poses serious
questions to the viability of the realist model. For those who believe in anarchic
international politics in which states only pursue self-help, it is still baffling to observe
that states commit to certain legal arrangements and often abide by them. 25
Regime theory emerged as one of the first theoretical responses to this phenomenon.
According to this theory, states’ behavior is shaped and changed pursuant to legal
regimes. 26 Stephen Krasner suggested a definition of regimes that now serves as the

structuralized by Kenneth Waltz: KENNETH WALTZ, MAN,
University Press, 2001) (1959).

THE

STATE, AND THE WAR (Columbia

23

With the increasing criticism of realism, its proponents developed a theory of protection using
game theory. They posit that in a world with no central authority, cooperation emerges out of
rational “tit-for-tat” logic created out of long-term exposures and interactions of states, ROBERT M.
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 60-63 (1984).

24

E.H Carr famously stated that the quality of law rests in its capability to bring stability without
which no political and social life is possible. Law’s special stature in today’s society is not due to
its subject-matter or its ethical dimension. However, society cannot survive with law alone. He
continues to stress the superiority of politics over law: “the ultimate authority of law derives from
politics.” E.H. C ARR, supra note 22 at, 166.

25

Judith Goldstein et al, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385, 391
(2000). On the other hand some scholars have tried to show that the role of realism in international
law has been downplayed and realism indeed served as a theoretical base for several developments
in international law, Richard H. Steinberg, Wanted—Dead or Alive: Realism in International Law
in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
146, 146-148 (2013).

26

Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables
in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1,1 (1983).

14

classical approach for regimes: “regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” 27 These regimes morph
actors’ exceptions and behaviors independently from the power dynamics of international
relations.28 Robert Keohane, another prominent regime theorist, noted that international
regimes perform valuable functions including reducing transaction costs, facilitating
negotiations and attaining mutual agreements between states via allowing certain types of
bargaining.29
Yet, the rational and functional account of international cooperation suffers from two
main shortcomings: It is highly difficult to measure both the costs incurred on states as a
result of cooperation and the benefits they gain from it. International investment law
serves as an illuminating example where studies deliver contradictory results on the
benefits states receive from participating in the investment regime. 30 In order to attract
foreign investment, states signs treaties that are not clear have any impact on bringing in
foreign investment.
Furthermore, the rational / functional account international cooperation fails to account
entirely for situations where states continue to partake in regimes even after they cease to

27

Id. at 2.

28

Id. at 10.

29

ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY 107 (1984). For a similar functional account on the way international organizations
work through centralization and independence, see Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States
Act Through Formal International Organizations 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 9-23 (1998).

30

Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 639 (1998).

15

benefit them. The Non-Proliferation Treaty regime serves as a good example for
countries, such as Iran, that never withdrew from the treaty, even after the costs seems to
have surpassed its benefits.31
Another school has tried to explain the judicialization in international relations by
employing a transnational approach. This is commonly referred to as the liberal school of
thought.32 Through the scholarly works of Moravcsik, Slaughter, Keohane and others, a
transnational explanation of states’ behavior has been put forward. 33 Briefly, this school
emphasizes the role of domestic actors and politics and their influence on the
international behavior of states. Unlike other international relations theories, as
Moravcsik argues, the liberal theory endeavors to furnish a systemic account of
international cooperation, which includes the dynamics of domestic politics. 34 This
approach has its roots in Peter Haas’ theory of ‘epistemic community’ 35, Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye’s theory of ‘complex interdependence’ 36 as well as Robert Putnam’s idea

31

Francois Nicoullaud, Iran’s NPT Withdrawal Option, LOBE LOG, 12 January 2015.

32

Judith Goldstein et al, supra note 25 at 392.

33

Id.

34

Andrew Moravcsik, Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining
in DOUBLE-EDGE DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 3, 7-9
(Peter Evans et al eds.,1993). Moravcsik provides examples of north-south relationship to buttress
his view point: 1) Carter human rights policy in Argentina and Guatemala, 2) US policies towards
Panama and Nicaragua 3) International Monetary Fund stabilization agreements in Jamaica and
Somalia, Id. at 20.

35

“Between international structures and human volition lies interpretation. Before choices involving
cooperation can be made, circumstances must be assessed and interests identified. In this regard,
to study the ideas of epistemic communities and their impact on policymaking is to immerse
oneself in the inner world of international relations theory and to erase the artificial boundaries
between international and domestic politics so that the dynamics between structure and choice can
be illuminated.”, Emmanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World
Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT’L ORG. 367, 367 (1992).
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of a ‘two-level game’37 among others. All of these theories attempt to interject elements
such as transnationalism, institutionalism as well as systemic implications for domestic
politics. Recent theories have leaned to deliver what could be called a ‘network account’
of regulations and norms and their effects on states behavior and international relations. 38
In all recent intellectual endeavors regarding international relations two developments are
noticeable: 1) the increasing importance of norms in shaping states behavior as well as
the international sphere; 2) the unprecedented and increasing process for the
judicialization and constitutionlization of international relations. In other words, new
practical and theoretical developments have “legalized” international relations.
On the status of international relations today, we can echo what critical thinkers have
asserted about capitalism. They believe “capitalism is fundamentally a legal ordering: the
bargains at the heart of capitalism are product of law.” 39 International relations have
become a legal ordering by which state interactions are defined, confined, and enabled by

36

“Complex interdependence, by contrast, is an ideal type of international system, deliberately
constructed to contrast with a “realist” ideal type that we outlined on the basis of realist
assumptions about the nature of international politics. Complex interdependence refers to a
situation among a number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies
(that is, states do not monopolize these contacts); there is not hierarchy of issues; and military
force is not used by governments towards one another.” Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nyle,
Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 INT’L ORG. 725, 731 (1987).

37

“Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic
conflict about what the “national interest” requires. Unlike the “Second Image” or the “Second
Image Reversed,” the two-level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to
reconcile domestic and international imperative simultaneously.” Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy
and Domestic Politics, The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 460 (1988).

38

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, supra note at 51; D AVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER:
DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 247-258 (2008)

39

David Grewal, Book Review: The Laws of Capitalism by Thomas Piketty, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626,
652 (2014).
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a legal ordering. The very basic unit of international relations, states, is a legal product
(through social contract, constitution, etc.).
We can even push the needle a bit further: power relations, the most fundamental feature
of international relations, are legal relations. Military capabilities cannot translate into
“hard power” unless they can have an impact on the legal ordering of the opponents
through change of constitution (e.g. Iraq), ratification of a treaty (e.g. Treaty of
Versailles), or creation of an international tribunal (e.g. International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia) and so on. It is as if the ultimate power is to have legal
jurisdiction—not physical power— over the opponent.

That’s reminiscent of “[t]he

supreme art of war” according to Sun Tzu, which “is to subdue the enemy without
fighting.”40

D. Constitutionalism in International Relations
As a legal and political unit, it is imperative to understand the role of constitutionalism in
international relations and international law. Liberal theories have asserted that domestic
politics and the structure of states determine states’ behavior at the international level. 41
Yet, they have focused on the liberal elements of states. The liberal camp, for instance,
have emphasized factors such as civil and political rights, separation of powers, a
functional judiciary system, rule of law, and democracy. As a result, “these particular
features of domestic political structure are important determinants of the interaction
40

SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR.

41

Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 537
(1995).
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between the State and individual and group actors in domestic and transnational
society.”42 The theory of democratic peace is a case in point. The focus of the study is on
“democracy” as a critical element in liberal democracy and its role in peacemaking in
international relations. This theory argues “liberal states, founded on such individual
rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property,
and elected representation are fundamentally against war…” 43 As this synopsis of the
theory shows us “liberal values” have been at the center of liberal theories in international
relations.
Much less discussed, however, is the issue of constitutionalism. As discussed,
constitutionalism is independent of liberal values such as the rule of law and democracy.
This notion, as set out earlier, focuses on the constraints of power relations between
political actors. The states’ constitutions do not have to be liberal constitutions. In this
sense, constitutions create a sense of unity that political actors take into account in their
decisions. As a result the constitutionalism of states affect states’ behavior. On the other
hand, international relations also affect the constitutionalism of states and the way
political actors perceive their roles in a political order. As a result, the discussion of
constitutionalism in international relations can fill the void in the literature that has
focused on liberal values.
The role of constitutionalism also can help us understand the perennial question in
international law and international relations as well: why do nations obey international

42

Id. at 511.

43

Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1551, 1551 (1986).
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law? There have been several waves of responses to this question: realists deny it, liberals
look into the states’ political systems for answers, some international law schools of
thought 44 point to decision-makers, rationalists (law and economics) refer to a costbenefit analysis of compliance, and transnationalists argue that through an internalization
process norms of international law penetrate into domestic legal systems. 45
The prevailing literature, however, does not look into the role of international law as an
exogenous element (the Other) in which states see themselves and their political order.
To put it differently, states find their constitutional identity through their interaction with
international law. It is similar to Cynthia Weber’s argument about intervention and
sovereignty. She claims “intervention practices participate in stabilizing the meaning of
sovereignty.”46 This is because the intervention discourse requires, a priori, a normative
structure, i.e. sovereignty, that should be intervened.47 For the same matter, participation
in international law requires, a priori, a legal ordering independent of international law.
As a result, states retroactively obtain the status of independence by participating in
international law, which retrospectively shapes their constitutional and political order.

44

See e.g. Myres McDougal & Harold Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1959) (“our chief interest is in the legal process,
by which we mean the making of authoritative and controlling decisions.”); see also Michael
Reisman, International Law-making: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
101,113 (legal process consists of “policy content, authority signal and control intention.”)

45

See generally, Harold Koh, Review Essay: Why do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.
J. 2599 (1996).

46

CYNTHIA WEBER, SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION,
CHANGE 4 (2001)

47

Id.
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In summary, the discussion of constitutionalism enriches the literature of international
law compliance by showing that states obey international law to hold their constitutional
order and identity together.

E. Why Iran?
It is now pervasive that popular movements, if successful, nail their colors to the mast by
ratifying a constitution. In fact, paradigmatically, constitutions function as a legitimacygiver to popular movements. We all have witnessed the constitutional efforts of the
recent, so-called, Arab Spring. Even before that, in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq—
evidently not cases of popular movement but foreign intervention—constitution drafting
acted to legitimize the new political order. In all these constitutional maneuvers, two
schools of constitutions were identified in the Middle East region: the Turkish model and
the Iranian model.48 This piece attempts to provide a fresh look at the Iranian Model.
Scholars in the West have identified the Iranian model as an Islamic Theocracy. 49
Politicians, such as Hilary Clinton, warned about the militarization of the Iranian
Government.

50

Conservatives have repeatedly dubbed the Iranian model as

48

See e.g. Mustafa Aykol, Turkey vs. Iran: The Regional Battle for Hearts and Minds, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Mar. 21, 2012, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137343/mustafaakyol/turkey-vs-iran

49

“Prior to the revolution in Iran, the conventional wisdom portrayed religion as a dying and
anachronistic force whose appropriate place was in history books. In utter defiance of that flawed
paradigm, the Shi’I ulama…became the “philosopher kings” of a new theocracy founded on the
doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih or the ulama’s direct rule.” MOHSEN MILANI, THE MAKING OF IRAN’S
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 2 (Westview Press, 1994).

50

James Strucke, Hilary Clinton: ‘Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship’, THE GUARDIAN,
Feb. 15th, 2010.
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fundamentalist and a promoter of terrorism. 51 Yet, none of these tags best describes the
nuances and complexities of constitutionalism in Iran.
One of the widely misconceived and yet understudied constitutional movements in the
Middle East belongs to Iran. 52 A new perspective on the trajectory of constitutionalism in
Iran would better equip us to comprehend rule of law and constitutionalism in the Middle
East. From the 1905 Constitutional movement to the 1979 Revolution, Iran has
undergone major changes. Each transformation created a rupture with the preceding order
fostering a fresh look at rule of law in Iran. The current studies have mainly concentrated
on the political and social aspects of these groundbreaking events. The legal aspect of
each of these events has remained largely unnoticed and under-researched.
In the wake of the recent uprisings in the Middle East, discussions have emerged
regarding whether people in the region would choose the Iranian, Turkish or an
idiosyncratic model for their future legal order. 53 Surprisingly, the discussion emerged in
a context where these models, in particular the Iranian model, were largely
misunderstood. The Iranian model was presented primarily as a theocratic Islamic regime

51

See e.g. “Iran is central to fundamentalism: its current Islamic Republic became a model for
fundamentalists elsewhere and the genesis of its revolution shows starkly the social strains that
can encourage a fundamentalist response.”, STEVE BRUCE, FUNDAMENTALISM 46 (2008).

52

For a discussion on constitutionalism in Islam, see Raja Bahlul, Is Constitutionalism Compatible
with Islam? in THE R ULE OF LAW HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM, 515, 515 (2007).

53

See e.g. Meliha Benli Altunisik, The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East, 27
ARAB STUD. Q. 45 (2005); Peter Jones, Arab Spring: Opportunities and Implications, 67 INT’L J
447 (2011); Seyla Benhabib, The Arab Spring: Religion, revolution and the public sphere,
EUROZINE (May 10, 2011), available at: http://www. eurozine. com/articles/2011-05-10-benhabiben; Asli Bâli, A Turkish Model for the Arab Spring?. 3 MIDDLE EAST L. AND GOVERN. 1 (2011):
1-2. Some scholars have discussed the Lebanese model too, see e.g. Asli Bali & Bernard Haykel,
Can Turkey or Lebanon be Models for a New Arab Political Order? Debating Law & Religion
Series, Yale Law School, Feb. 4, 2014.

22

where rule of law remained suppressed and inferior to the Sharia law with no elements of
constitutionalism.

Nevertheless,

this

narrative

is

distant

from

the

story

of

constitutionalism and to a certain extent rule of law in Iran. This dissertation aims to
present a new and comprehensive view on constitutionalism in Iran with a focus on the
Islamic Revolution of 1979 and its aftermath. By no means, do I posit that the Iranian
model is a viable option or a desirable model for the people in the Middle East region. I,
along with many other scholars, 54 believe that it is the people of each country that should
decide about their political future while designing a special constitutional order of their
own. However, the discussions that emerged as a result of the uprisings in the Middle
East sparked my interest in exploring what is called the Iranian model. Despite its
importance, no major existing constitutional book or treatise has elaborated on the
nuances of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitutionalism. This is going to be a first
attempt at describing constitutionalism in Iran.
The story of constitutionalism in Iran includes diverse elements such as religious law,
popular movement, revolutionary ideals, charismatic leadership as well as the postcharisma era. There are certain factors that make Iran a critical case to study regarding
the effect of constitutionalism in international relations:

1. Duration of the constitution:

54

See e.g. Asli Bali & Bernard Heykal, supra note 6.
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In a seminal work, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton analyze the endurance and longevity of
national constitutions. They gathered data from every independent state from 1789 to
2005, which included 935 different constitutional systems for more than 200 nation
states.55 They show that the average lifespan for constitutions is 19 years meaning that
most constitutions perish before their 19th anniversary. 56 In fact, there are “only a
handful” that last longer than fifty years.57 Juxtaposing this simple fact with the current
Iranian Constitution, we see that the Iranian Constitution has already surpassed the
average life span. The Constitution was voted for in 1979 and has endured for roughly 36
years.

2. Islamic supremacy clauses
One of the most pressing issues in comparative constitutionalism is related to Islamic
supremacy clauses. These clauses aim to structure the political order based on Sharia
law. As a result, the question has been whether the constitutions with these clauses
conform to liberal and democratic values. 58 These clauses have either of two forms: 1)
either they designate Islam as the or a source of law 2) or they stipulate that laws contrary
to Islamic Law are void and should be repealed. As a matter of terminology, the former

55

ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 6 (2009).

56

Id. at 1.

57

Id.

58

Some scholars such as Noah Feldman question this type of enquiry: “…it is necessary to ask
whether the focus on liberty in particular in the symposium’s title reflected some assumption,
unconscious, or otherwise, that Islamic law poses a special threat to the general phenomenon of
constitutional liberty, taken to mean something like “the benefits of living in a liberal,
constitutional state.”, Feldman, supra note 14, at 438.
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clauses are called “Islamic supremacy clauses” and the latter are called “Islamic
repugnancy clauses.” 59 Interestingly enough, Iran was the first country to adopt an
Islamic supremacy clause in its 1907 constitution. 60 Henceforth, the Iranian constitution
arguably acted as a model for other constitutions, which incorporated such supremacy
clauses.61

3. Early constitutional movement in the region
Iran’s constitutional movement in 1906 is one of the earliest movements of its kind in the
region. In fact, the preceding constitutions in the region were not sustained by any
popular movement except that of Egypt.62 Furthermore, the 1861 Constitution of Tunisia,
the 1876 Constitution of Ottoman, and the Egyptian Constitution of 1882 did not last
long. 63Iran’s 1907 Constitution, in contrast, came as a result of a popular movement,
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Dawood Ahmed & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The Surprising
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http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1919&context=public_law_and_
legal_theory
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Id. at 1.
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“It [the repugnancy clause in the Iranian Constitution] bears credit for introducing the very first
language of repugnancy that would migrate transnationally into future constitutions.”, Id. at 18.
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Saïd Amir Arjomand, Islam and Constitutionalism since the Nineteenth Century: the Significance
and Peculiarities of Iran in ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCES TO TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, 33, 34-35 (2008).
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Id.
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which involved both Islamic clerics and non-clerics.64 The Iranian Constitution in the
language of Amir Arjomand started the second wave of constitutionalism in the region. 65
4. New constitutional movements in the region
The most important constitutional wave in the contemporary era happened in the
aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. In search for constitutional models, many actors
repeatedly and vehemently dismissed the Iranian model as an “aspiration for Arabs”. 66
By the Iranian model, they mean a theocratic regime in which Islamic Law dictates all
aspects of political and legal order. The Iranian government, on the other hand, rushed to
claim that the Arab Spring was Islamic in nature implying that it should follow the path
of the Iranian model. 67 The Iranian model seemed to be perceived as a model that treats
Islam as an identity or ideology versus other models such as Turkey or even Pakistan that
view Islamic Law as merely a source of law. 68 The current tension between Iran’s
constitutionalism and other emerging constitutional orders in the region renders the Iran
case unique for examining the transnational impact of constitutionalism.
5. Interaction with international law

64

“The Ulama, the official interpreters of the shari’a, had been invited to participate in the drafting
of the Tunisian Constitution of 1861, but declined, arguing that it was a political matter and
therefore did not concern them.”, Id.
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Id.
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Fatima Ahmad Alsmadi, The ‘Iranian Model’ is no inspiration for Arabs, Aljazeera, Oct. 5, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/10/iranian-model-no-inspiration-a2014105101919853679.html
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Saïd Amir Arjomand, Revolution and Constitution in the Arab World in BEYOND
SPRING: THE EVOLVING RULING BARGAIN IN THE MIDDLE EAST 151,165 (2014).
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Interestingly enough, Iran has a long history of engagement and dis-engagement with
international law. From the nationalization of oil to the hostage crisis, Iran was actively
involved in the development of international law. Iran did not simply dismiss
international law and its effects. Instead, it tried to shape it. For instance, one of the early
investment tribunals at the international level is the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. It created
critical precedents for expropriation, which later became the bedrock and backbone of
today’s international investment law and arbitration. Despite its contentious relationship
with Western countries, Iran never secluded itself from the possibilities of engagement in
world affairs through international law.
6. Iran Deal
Following months of negotiations, Iran signed a deal with the P5+1 countries to curb its
nuclear activates in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions. This Deal is probably
the most important arms agreement in the post-Cold War era. Yet, Iran’s compliance with
its commitments under the deal remains uncertain. As a result, a historical analysis of
constitutionalism in Iran and its relations to Iran’s international commitment will shed
light on the question of Iran’s compliance with the Deal. This pressing matter cannot be
studied in isolation. To comprehend and predict Iran’s future behavior, a robust analysis
of its constitutionalism and international commitments is needed.
In summary, this is a first attempt to provide a new and fresh view of the Iranian
revolution and its aftermath. In addition to constitutionalism in Iran, this research will
help us understand Islam and constitutionalism and the Iranian model of political order.
Understanding constitutionalism in Iran will help us comprehend foreign policy as well
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as Iran’s international commitments. In other words, there is an inextricable link between
the constitutionalism of Iran and its international behavior. This factor is largely
neglected when scholars, pundits, and policymakers analyze the behavior of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and its international commitments. With the unfolding of the Iran Deal
to occur within the next decade or more, it is crucial to have a deep grasp of the
interaction between constitutionalism and compliance with international commitments
with regards to Iran. The research aims to demonstrate the extent to which
constitutionalism has a direct effect on international commitments and vice versa.

F. Structure of the Discussion

The methods used to study a constitution can vary significantly. One can take a purely
textual and linguistic approach. 69 Another approach is to investigate and extract the
original intent of the drafter of the constitution under study. 70 Some believe in the
concept of a living constitution by endorsing a method of contextual interpretation based
on the “changing environment” in which we live in. 71 Others take a hybrid approach and
intend to blend originalism with the living constitutionalism method. 72 However, none of
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Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States is famous for his textualist approach to
the Constitution, see e.g. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal
Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597 (1990).
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See e.g. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (1988).
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William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (“The
framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations
the task of applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which they live.”)
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JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011). (“The method of text and principle is both
originalist and living constitutionalist. It is faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional
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these approaches may be helpful for a meta-analysis (discourse analysis) of a constitution
in a developing country with intermittent turmoil and popular uprising tumultuous
setting. In other words, these methods guide us through times of normal politics and help
us interpret the constitution one way or another. When dealing with a fledgling
constitutional order with ebbs and flows and its relevance to the political order, a new
method is needed. Normal politics are distinct from constitutional politics. Normal
politics refers to times when governments operate with minimal intervention by the
people daily political activities. But, “under special constitutions conditions” people’s
decisions have an impact on normal politics. This is what Professor Ackerman calls
“constitutional politics”:
“Before gaining the authority to enact its proposal into a nation’s higher law, a political
movement must, first, convince an extraordinary number of its fellow citizens to take its
proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to politics; second
allow opponents a fair opportunity to organize their own forces; third, convince a
majority of Americans to support transformative initiatives as their merits are discussed,
time and again, in the deliberative for a provided by the dualist constitutional order for
this purpose. It is only those initiatives that survive this specially onerous higher
lawmaking system that earn the special kind of legitimacy the dualist accords to decisions
made by the People.” 73

text and to its underlying purposes. It is also consistent with a basic law who reach and application
evolve over time, a basic law that leaves to each generation the task of how to implement text and
principle in their own time.”)
73

Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L. J., 453, 461 (1989): see
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993). See also Bruce Ackerman,
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This approach links a popular movement to constructional changes, termed
“constitutional moments”. 74 According to this school, major shifts in constitutional law in
the US occurred outside the prescribed method of Article V of the Constitution. It is not
“normal politics” that determine and shape constitutional change. It is popular demand
and movement that morph most of constitutional change. Ackerman posits that the China
and Russia cases are outlier examples in the modern era. Their popular uprisings did not
end in constitutionalism. For several decades, those examples have been employed to
show that revolutions and popular uprisings do not lead to constitutionalism. This view
has been dominant in framing the Iranian revolution, which is thought to follow the tragic
fate of constitutionalism in Russia. 75 This new wave of American Constitutionalism
studies can be applied to fledgling constitutional orders such as Iran. Due to a lack of
robust institutions for people to interfere with government decisions, constitutional
politics is more important in shaping the political order of states such as Iran. In other
words, popular movements remain the only way to change the course of
constitutionalism.

Constitutional Politics/ Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L. J. 453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013 (1984).
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Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992); Walter Burnham, Constitutional Moments
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Applying this grand view on comparative constitutionalism we can spot four critical time
points in constitutionalizing popular movements.76 At the first time point, the leader of
the movement challenges the legitimacy of the current political order. At the second time
point, the charisma of the leader of the movement leads to a constitution as a legitimizing
document. During this time, the charisma of the leader becomes constitutionalized. In
other words, as the charisma of the leader dwindles the constitutional authority of the
legal establishment rises. At the third time point, a succession crisis occurs after the
charismatic leader passes away, resigns, or simply quits politics. The succession period
results in the bureaucratization of charisma. This might lead to the downgrading or
weakening of constitutionalism. At this time, normal politics take over the constitutional
moments by creating a top-down political party system. This creates tension with the
judicial body as it observes constitutional elements being undermined. At the fourth time
point, the judicial body purports to safeguard the constitutionalism in a battle with other
forces and branches of government. The cycle of constitutionalism ends with the judicial
body protecting the constitution.
This discussion discusses the constitutionalism of the Iranian Revolution in three phases:
1. The formulation phase explores the events leading up to the Revolution and its
immediate aftermath. In this chapter, the dissertation shows how the idea of the Iranian
Constitution was morphed. It focuses on the ideas of Khomeini, the leader of the
Revolution, and the viewpoints of the drafters of the Constitution. 2. The establishment
phase assesses how the ideas of the leader and the revolutionaries became embodied in
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Bruce Ackerman, World Constitutionalism, (Work-in-Progress).

31

the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It endeavors to comprehend the
transformation of the ideas of revolutionaries into the Constitution as well as the
suppression of alternative narratives. 3. The succession phase deals with the death of the
leader and its aftermath. This chapter analyzes how the charisma of the leader was
bureaucratized and impacted the amendments of 1989 of the Constitution. This chapter
aims to assess the impact of the end of charisma on the rule of law, the constitution and
the political legal culture of Iran in the following years.
This research applies this four-stage methodology in studying the history of Iranian
constitutionalism. It looks at critical ruptures and historical junctures that left important
marks on constitutionalism in Iran and had an impact on its international behavior. This
research also applies a version of the liberalist framework to understand the extent to
which constitutional politics had an impact on the international commitments of Iran.

II. Sparking the Flame: Revolution

A. Revolt against Despotism
The Iranian Revolution came as a shock to many, including the US Government, which
lost an important ally in the region. The popular revolt against the Shah’s regime marked
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the first and probably the largest uprising in the Middle East in the modern era. A year
before the massive movement of people, the idea of a revolution in Iran was
unthinkable.77 The underlying cause(s) of the Iranian Revolution ha(ve) remained highly
contested. Several theories have attempted to explain the Iranian Revolution. Similar to
recent analyses of the Arab Spring, an economic explanation serves as one of the main
theories examining the Iranian Revolution. Simply put, this theory points to ill-chosen
economic strategies as well as excessive governmental expenditure, income inequality
and related factors as main causes of the Iranian people’s revolt. 78 Yet, the economic
explanation can hardly describe the widespread dissatisfaction prior to the Revolution. 79
The Iranian economy enjoyed unprecedented growth during the Shah’s period due to
many factors including an unexpected surge of oil prices and massive investment in
infrastructure. In fact, Iran’s growth—roughly 9.6 % from 1960-1977, according to the
World Bank—exceeded the average of other countries in the World. 80 It is fair to say,
however, that the economic growth led to the strengthening of the middle class, which in
turn found the chance to strongly demand its pursuit of liberty and justice. 81
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A very common explanation points to the lavish spending of the Shah’s government especially
after the oil price skyrocketed. Shah and his wife’s dream of making Iran a Western-like country
in the Middle East inspired them to spend excessive money on ceremonies and luxurious events
which, it is widely believed, infuriated the middle class people, VALI NASR, FORCES OF FORTUNE:
THE RISE OF THE NEW MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS AND WHAT IT WILL MEAN FOR OUR WORLD 132135 (2009).
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For a general view on the impact of middle class in the Middle East politics, see NASR, supra note
3 at 1-28. Nasr believes that the tie between Shah and the middle class was dismantled due to the
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Other analyses pinpoint alternative factors as drivers of the Iranian Revolution. The
sociological explanation magnifies the effects of modernism and the respective cultural
shock in Iran. Undoubtedly, Pahlavi’s regime contributed to the modernization of Iran
through the building of railroads and universities to establishing a more efficient and
stable bureaucracy that is required for running a modern state. Iran had never experienced
such a rapid headlong rush into modernism in its history. The efforts to modernize Iran
during the Qajari Dynasty were limited to military equipment and low-scale bureaucratic
changes.82 It was not until Pahavil’s era that an unleashed modernism transformed the
lives of ordinary people in Iran especially in big cities. Unsurprisingly, it brought about
backlash from the society particularly from the traditional and religious sector. The
religious sector, either independently or due to the pressure it felt from its base, started to
issue fatwas and orders limiting or prohibiting certain aspects of modernism. 83 This
coincided with the influence of leftist ideas coming from Iran’s neighbor, the Soviet
Union. Gradually, a wide range of domestic leftist literature was produced by a group of
scholars and journalists as well as religious people. Soon, a few Western educated
scholars, most notably Shairati, came up with a combination of the Islamic and Marxist

coup that overthrew the democratic government of Mosadegh, Id. at 122-124. He believed the
middle class finally found its hero in Khomeini, Id. at 129.
82

During Qajari’s Dynasty, Iranians exposed to West and its new industrialized face, mainly through
military encounter. At the time, the Iranian military was very weak and disorganized. The rulers
did not pay attention to modernize the military with training and new equipment. Only Abbas
Mirza, the Crown Prince, made several attempts to modernize the military. He died in 1833 after
series of defeats Iranians had from Russians. Iran lost large portions of lands following each defeat
to Russia, NIKKIE R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION 27-30 (2003).
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In one of the notable examples, the religious people with the leadership of some clerics denounced
the introduction of showering. At the time people would bath in a small pool the measurement of
which was dictated by religious clerics. With the use of force, Reza Shah broke the resistance of
people and eventually water pipelines and showers became widespread.
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narrative, which was widely embraced and read. Khomeini’s anti-modernism rhetoric
could aptly garner support from the disgruntled group of people shocked by the effects of
unexpected modernism. 84
Not surprisingly, the literature is replete with narratives that enumerate the demand for
Islamization as the underlying cause of the revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s
government has propounded this narrative for the last three decades through its official
and unofficial media channels. Ironically, however, several analyses in the West have
also followed this narrative by depicting the Iranian Revolution as purely Islamic and
framing it under a common buzzword, fundamentalist.85 86
Yet, framing the Iranian Revolution under the paradigm of Islamization as well as
fundamentalism does not correctly explain the nuances of the Revolution and its
aftermath. First and foremost, Shiism, as the leading religion in Iran, has not historically
offered a theory of government. In fact, Shia jurists staunchly shunned taking political
positions, as they believed that domain belonged to monarchs and rulers. Khomeini’s
ideas of the leadership of an Islamic jurist became widely known much later in the
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AMUZEGAR, supra note 2, at 39.
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See e.g. MICHAEL RICHARDS, REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY 73 (2004); P.J. TIERNEY,
THEOCRACY: C AN DEMOCRACY SURVIVE FUNDAMENTALISM? RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM AND PLURALISM 106 (2012) [arguing that that the religious
hardliners successfully used the general frustrations resulted from modernism in Iran to advance
their theocratic and fundamentalist ideas.] BEVERLEY MILTON-EDWARDS, ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM SINCE 1945 81-83 (2005) [arguing that the Revolution was a result of
Khomeini’s fundamentalist ideas in addition the Iranian left.]
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The word fundamentalism carries a negative connotation. It is a difficult term to define but it is yet
commonly used to describe various movements, organizations, and states. To roughly delineate
the concept, it refers to ideas that reactive in character, dichotomous in nature (seeing the world in
black and white, good and evil), messianic in its historical approach, LEONARD WEINBERG &
AMIR PEDAHZUR, INTRODUCTION IN RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM 56 (Leonard Weinberg & Amir Pedahzur eds, 2004).
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Iranian movement, a fact indicating that people did not revolt, questing for Islamization.
Moreover, the text of the Constitution, speeches of Khomeini before and after the
revolution as well as the struggle of the Iranian Government in the implementation of
Islamic rules in the past thirty years serve as other indicators that we should not make the
mistake of equating the Iranian movement with an Islamic or fundamental movement. 87
Furthermore, as noted by scholars, contrary to the commonly held belief, the Iranian
Revolution did not stand as a model or prototype for fundamentalist movements in the
region, many of which existed long before the Iranian Revolution. 88
The demand of rule of law as a crucial cause for the Revolution of Iranians has remained
an often-neglected narrative. The intellectual debates surrounding the Iranian Revolution
have been hijacked either by economic-centric liberals or religion-oriented conservatives,
both of whom ignore the demand for rule of law and the role it played in the Iranian
Revolution. The Iranian Revolution should be seen in light of the Constitutional
Movement of 1905 and Mosaddegh’s Movement of 1951 as well as the Reformist
Movement of 1997 and the post-2009 election protests. The common thread that links all
these movements does not revolve around economic prosperity demands or a quest for
the governance of Islamic values; in all of the movements a strong and predominant
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The Islamization paradigm rests on the presupposition that it is the culture, which drives the
politics as well as social movements. However, some scholars believe that at the time of political
development every other aspects of a society including cultural demands become subjugated to
politics, BEHROOZ MOAZAMI, STATE, RELIGION, AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN, 1796 to the Present
117-119 (2013).
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STEPHEN W. WALT, REVOLUTION AND WAR 247 (1996) [“…most contemporary Islamic
movements predate the revolution in Iran, and their growing popularity is due more to indigenous
trneds than to the transmission of revolutionary ideas from Tehran.”]; Walt keenly observes that as
much as the Iranian Revolution could have inspired other movements, it equally warned against
the dangers and turmoil following such massive mobilization, Id. at 248.
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demand for democratization and the rule of law can evidently be observed. The rule of
law narrative allows us to have a better grasp of the Iranian Constitution as well as the
aftermath of political developments in Iran.
B. Structure of the Revolution
Understanding the structure and framework in which the revolution emerged and
developed, is critical to comprehending the rule of law in Iran. The current literature tells
us in detail the socio-economic developments of Iran during the Shah’s regime and the
Iranian movement. Little attention has been paid to the normative aspect of the Iranian
movement; which in the following years has delineated the constitutional as well as
political culture. Normative assertions do not merely serve as a cover for underlying
socio-economic demands. The movements are shaped, transformed or defined by the
normative claims of the leaders and followers of the movements. First, we take a brief
look at the socio-economic transformation of Iran during the Shah’s time that
significantly contributed to the uprising of the Iranian people.
The, so-called “minor industrial revolution” 89 of Iran has caused vast changes in the
society. Iran underwent a transformation from being an agrarian society to a developing
industrial nation. This phenomenon along with the surge in the number of educated
people created new classes in the society, which in the long run became the force of the
revolution. With the unraveling of feudalism in Iran, farmers became landowners and
independent. The idea of land reform came from Hassan Arsanjani, the agriculture
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Abrahamian believes that Iran experienced a minor industrial revolution between 1963-1977 in
which the share of manufacturing rose from 11 to 17 percent in the GNP of Iran, ERVAND
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minister of Iran. 90 This law intended to break large pieces of land into smaller pieces and
hand the ownership to farmers. The landowners or “feudalists” at the time were allowed
to retain one of their villages but their other owned villages were sold to peasants
working in the farmlands. 91 Such a large-scale reform was not without criticism and
flaws,92 however, eventually it led to the creation of a new class of people with new
demands. 93 Overall, similar to other industrial revolutions, in Iran, industrialization
resulted in the emergence of two classes of people: the new urban city middle class
enjoying high levels of education; the other, the marginalized urban dwellers living in
slums on the outskirts of cities, some of whom came to cities in search of a job as a result
of the downfall of agriculture in Iran. The latter group’s area of residence was and is, less
commonly so, referred to as “steel towns” indicating the poor quality of their houses.
Another important class that played a role in the revolution was the business owners or
more accurately, those who were working in the “bazar”. This was not a new class.
Traditionally they played a major role in the Iranian social and political movements
including the Constitutional Revolution. However, the flow of unprecedented petrodollar
revenue fortified this class in an unprecedented way. The facilitation of import and export
along with the increasing purchasing power of Iranians—due to the high growth of
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Arsajani was forced to resign in 1963, two years after the reform was legislated in 1962. His idea
was later adopted by the Shah in the so-called “white revolution” which will be discussed later.
The Shah could not tolerate Arsanjani to enjoy the popularity it gained from the land reform
initiative, KEDDIE, supra note 82, at 152.
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KEDDIE, supra note 82, at 148 (2003).
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The main problem with the reform was that the lands allotted to the peasants were not enough and
the peasants were not enough and the peasants did not have the means to maintain the lands and
make them profitable, Id. at 152.
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The lot given to the new farmers was allegedly not enough for them to establish an independent
and rather profitable business.
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national income—made the Bazaris economically very strong. Interestingly enough,
Bazaris have been traditionally quite dependent on the clerics for legitimizing their
business. In a country where positive law was not very strong yet, it was the clerics who
would decide the rights and wrongs of businesses. The new Westward gestures of the
Shah along with his apathetic moves towards religion increasingly lost him the support of
the clerics and religious people. The disgruntled clerics garnered the support of the
Bazaris. Business people traditionally would financially support the clerics under the
rubric of what could be called “religious taxes”.94 This made the clerics quite powerful. 95
Unlike many other clerics at the time, Khomeini criticized politics with a political ideal in
mind. He, similar to other clerics, remained suppressed and largely silent during Reza
Shah’s period. Reza Shah would not tolerate any dissidents or critiques of his policies. 96
At the time also, the general conviction among the clerics rested on the idea that clerics
should not interfere with politics. This conviction is deeply rooted in Shiism that
historically was marginalized from mainstream politics.
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Mohammad Hassan
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Khoms is the main religious tax, which equals the fifth of a Shia Muslims income per year. Khoms
should be given to a high rank Islamic jurist per annual religious fiscal year
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One of the important venues in which new theories of Shiism developed was in Hosseiniye
Ershad. Several influential thinkers depicted a new image of Islam, Shiism that contributed greatly
to normative aspect of the Iranian Revolution. Among those figures were Shariati and Ayatollah
Mottahari. The financial support would come from Bazaris, MILANI, at 378.
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“…Reza Shah certainly did not countenance opposition or criticism from the clerics. There are
many anecdotes about his brutal treatment of those he regarded as troublemakers. The most
famous is undoubtedly the story that he stormed into the great mosque in Qom in 1928, muddy
boots and all, to horsewhip a cleric who had complained about the queen visiting the shrine
without wearing a veil”, ELTON L. DANIEL, THE HISTORY OF IRAN, 140 (2012).
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Khomeini’s theory of government is indebted to the Sunni various theories of government. Quite
evidently Khomeini could not find precedent in Shiism to support his idea of ruling of a jurist,
Said Amir Arjomand, Ideological Revolution in Shiism in AUTHORITY AND POLITICAL C ULTURE IN
SHIISM (Said Amir Arjomand, ed. 1988).
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Boroujerdi, who had tremendous influence on the Qom seminary, believed firmly that the
clerics should stay away from politics. Boroujerdi’s intellectual dominance over the Qom
seminary would not allow Khomeini to voice his political opinions publicly.99 Following
the death of Boroujerdi in 1961, the Qom seminary became more pluralized. 100 Khomeini
seized the first opportunity and established himself as one of the leading Islamic jurists
who eventually attracted many followers.101102 However, it was not until 1962 in which
he publicly flexed his muscles, directly against the Shah.
During the Shah’s visit to the US in 1962, it became clear that Kennedy and the US
government supported reform efforts in Iran, which had already started with Amini the
Prime Minister at the time. The purpose of the Shah’s trip was to convince Kennedy that
Iran needed more military equipment so it could curtail the threat of communism in Iran
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Probably the first theory of government in Shiism emerged in when Safavid Dynasty ruled Iran
and for the first time declared Shiism as the religion of the land. Even then, the clerics devised a
theory of government which basically would recognize the Safavid monarchy as a legitimate
government until the last Imam of Shia would re-emerge, VALI NASR, THE SHIA REVIVAL, HOW
CONFLICTS WITHIN ISLAM WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE 74-75 (2006)
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In the event of Mossadegh movement, Boroujerdi in fact sided with the Shah. Mossadegh who
became the leader of democratic movement in Iran and hero of nationalization of oil in Iran, had a
clash with the Shah. At the time, other clerics including Ayatollah Kashani and Ayatollah
Shariatmadari decided to support Mossadegh publicly, ABBAS MIANI, EMINENT PERSIANS 369-370
(2008).
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MILANI, Id. at 371.
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“Khomeini’s rise to prominence began with the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi on March 30,
1961”, MILANI, Id. at 353.
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Amini, the then prime minister, took a trip to Qom to visit the top clerics at the time. Khomeini
was amongst clerics that Amini visited. Milani suggests that reason for inclusion of Khomeini in
that list is still unknown today because Khomeini at the time was not considered a top echelon
cleric. Interestingly enough, in the meeting with Amin, it was Khomeini who did most of the
talking and more importantly talked on behalf the “people”, ABBAS MILANI, THE SHAH 273 (20112012).
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and stand as a wall against the expansion of the Soviet Union. 103 Upon his return to Iran,
the Shah seemed determined to implement certain social reforms, which later were called
“the White Revolution” or “The Shah and People Revolution.” 104 With the help of the
newly appointed prime minister, who is commonly regarded as a mouthpiece of the
Royal Court, the Shah embarked on starting reforms. The White Revolution entailed 19
reforms, six of which were introduced in 1962.105 Although the reforms seemed to be
essential, the mistrust between the Shah and the clergy class caused a backlash with
Khomeini establishing himself as the main critic and opponent. One of the reforms
included a change in the local election law, a matter that seemed insignificant at the
onset. The new law mandated that oath be taken with a book, eliminating Quran as the
only source for taking oath in consideration of other religious minorities in Iran.
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The Shah and Kennedy’s view did not converge on this point: “the Shah was worried about the
Soviet Union and Iraqi threat and wanted a bigger army and more military expenditures, while
Kennedy believed the biggest threat facing the Shah was the domestic situation and wanted to
push for more reforms and a bigger slice of the budget for social expenditures. Since it was the
U.S. Government that had to pay for much of any expansion of the Iranian military, Kennedy’s
views carried particular weight.” MILANI, supra note, at 285.
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The White Revolution allegedly originates from a news paper article that stated that the reform
was necessary and it could be implemented within one of the two paradigms: red revolution of the
Soviet Union and the White Coup of the United States. The term White Revolution was first used
by Amini, MILANI, supra note, at 290.
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19 elements of the White Revolution are: 1. Land reforms program with the aim of abolishing
feudalism in Iran by buying lands from land ords and selling it to the peasants below the market
value with some other financial incentives. 2. Nationalization of forests and pasturelands. 3.
Privatization of the government-owned enterprises. 4. Profit sharing for industrial workers by
allowing them to have 20% share of the net profits of the industry in which they worked. 5.
Suffrage for women. 6. Formation of the literacy corps by sending educated people to rural areas
in order to eradicate or minimize the then high illiteracy rate. 7. Formation of the health corps. 8.
Formation of reconstruction and development corps. 9. Formation of houses of equity 10.
Nationalization of all water resources 11. Urban and rural modernization and reconstruction 12.
Education reform 13. Expanding worker’s right to own shares in the industrial complexes 14.
Price stabilization 15. Free and compulsory education 16. Food stamps for mothers in need of
financial help 17. Introduction of social security and national insurance 18. Stable and reasonable
cost of renting or buying residential properties 19. Introduction of measures to fight against
corruption, Iran: The White Revolution, Time Magazine, Feb 11, 1966.
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However, this matter infuriated Khomeini who, in an unprecedented move, sent two
letters with a messianic tone directly addressing the Shah in which he openly criticized
the new practice of oath taking and warned against its consequences. Khomeini in his
letters did not just voice his opinion but framed it as national interest and people’s
demands:
“…Islam is not indicated as a precondition for standing for office and women are being
granted the right to vote… as you know, national interests and spiritual comfort are both
predicated on following Islamic laws. Please order all laws inimical to the sacred and
official faith of the country to be eliminated from government policies.” 106
Surprisingly, the Shah responded, telling Khomeini that “new laws proposed by the
government contain nothing new, and I want to remind you that I more than anyone am
keen on respecting our religious roles.” 107 The Shah did now show signs of withdrawal
from the policy in the letter, however, he responded to Khomeini, a fact that helped
Khomeini in the process of establishing himself as a representative of Muslims and
Iranians. Khomeini did not stop there. He responded to the Shah’s letter cautioning him
to avoid the “wrath of Muslims”. Neither side showed any compromise in their stance.
However, eventually the clergy won the battle when Alam, the prime minister, declared
that the proposed election bill was withdrawn. Not long after that, the Shah announced
his “Shah and People Revolution” program.
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MILANI, supra note, at 291 [Translate the letter yourself]
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Id. [Translate the letter yourself]. The Shah tried to humiliate Khomeini by calling him “Hoja tol
eslam” instead of “ayatollah”. Hojat to eslam is a lower rank classification of clergies indicating,
inter alia, that they do not have and cannot have official followers.
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The clergy became disgruntled about two elements of the so-called White Revolution: the
right of vote for women and the land reform. 108 The Shah knowingly started a fight with
clerics over these reforms, delivering lectures dubbing the clergy as “black reaction”
which have “little, empty and antique” brains. 109 The Shah held a referendum in which
women could vote, to show that the majority of people supported the so-called White
Revolution. 99.5 percent of voters agreed with the reform in a highly questionable
referendum. 110 Khomeini, however, took a rather different route than other clerics.
Instead of focusing on women’s suffrage and the land reform, he targeted the bigger
picture. He framed the reforms as mandates of Americans and Israelis and he ordered
Muslims to boycott the referendum. He declared that the reforms would pave the way for
further influence of the West, specifically the US, into the affairs of Iranians. His
narrative was centered on anti-colonialism.111 The heated rhetoric of Khomeini with the
relentless support for the reforms by the Shah resulted in the establishment of the
Khomeini-Shah dichotomy; which eventually materialized in the form a street clash on
June 5 of 1963.
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Land reform was the idea of Arsanjani, the agricultural minister of the Amini Administration. The
Shah decided to implement the project hoping to gain support from peasants and farmers. The
reform was mismanaged and poorly implemented, leaving peasants with not enough land to be
able to remain independent and profitable. In turn, with the rise of oil revenue, this class decided
to migrate to cities. Milani believes that the unhappy peasants not only did not become the
supporters of the Shah, but they served as foot soldiers for the Islamic Revolution, Id. at 292-293.
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Id. at 295.

110

For instance, the ballot boxes were open under the surveillance of police and security forces. Id. at
294.
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The Shah was convinced that Khomeini had accepted money and support from Nasser of Egypt.
This was among the accusations when Khomeini was arrested, Id. at 301.
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Khomeini did not limit himself to lectures and heated speeches. He instituted a
relationship with three underground groups in the March of 1963. The head of these three
groups met with Khomeini in order to form a coalition. The meeting turned out to be
successful as these leaders embarked on creating a national network in order to organize
demonstrations, protests, distribution of materials etc. Later on, Khomeini’s declarations
were distributed via the help of this network among other venues.112 Furthermore, the
group initiated a militia branch for the battles with the Shah as well as assassination
attempts.
The clash of June 5, 1963 reified what could be aptly called the “Khomeini
Movement.”113 It was followed by the arrest of Khomeini who delivered a critical speech
against the Shah on the day of Ashura, a holy day in Iran that represents revolt against a
cruel ruler. Khomeini was transported to Tehran and the rumor soon spread that he might
be executed. This frightening news made other senior clergies submit a proclamation
stating that Khomeini is in fact a marja taghlid, i.e. the highest stature in Shiism, which
literally means the source of emulation. This initiative would have prevented the
execution of Khomeini had the government intended to so because due to an unwritten
constitutional rule an Islamic jurist of that high rank could not be executed. The initiative
proved to be successful and Khomeini was released.
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“It was a measure of the power of the new group in 1963 that they could distribute 250,000 copies
of some of Khomeini’s proclamations.” Id. at 296.
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Id. at 303 (for forces loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini, June 5, 1963, was nothing short of the birth of
the “Khomeini Movement.”)
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Khomeini’s exile from Iran marked a critical moment in the path of the Iranian
movement. Following the release of Khomeini from imprisonment, he continued to voice
his objection to the Shah’s policies. In October 6, 1964 the Parliament of Iran passed a
law at the proposal of the Prime Minister Hassan-Ali Mansur, which was commonly
referred to as “Capitulations”. The law was actually a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) with the United States because the Shah insisted on the US army training Iranian
military. This law bestowed immunity on the US armed forces in the event of
wrongdoings and delegated trial to the American military courts. This law infuriated
Khomeini as the most vociferous opponent of the bill who quickly reacted by delivering
an acerbic and critical speech. He emphasized the national humiliation resulting from the
law, by which no one could protest if “an American cook runs over the Shah, or a marja,
or a high-ranked official.” Later, he issued a statement focusing on the Islamic rule that
mandates that infidels have no control over Muslims. At this time, the Shah decided to
exile Khomeini.114
By the time Khomeini was exiled, he had already established himself as the foremost
opponent of the Shah and the leader of the opposition movement. Furthermore, he had
achieved the highest stature in Islam, and was accepted as one of the Maraj taghlids in
Iran. He was also astute enough to establish a network of underground supporters so that
his messages could traverse across the various groups of people. Contrary to what the
Shah had in mind, exile did not erase Khomeini from the memory of the people.
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“The Prime Minister soon paid with his life for his role in the affair, and Khomeini was catapulted
into the center of Iranian politics.” Id. at 307. “The events of 1963 had clearly affected the Shah’s
physical and psychological condition. In February 1964, accompanied by the Queen, he took a trip
to Europe.” Id. at 307.
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Conversely, exile idolized Khomeini whose statements were widely distributed and read
with passion. Exile did not throttle the movement of the revolution yet expedited it.
Living in exile also provided time for Khomeini to formulate the structure and nuances of
the future government.
From then on, the Shah’s government started to stumble between two extremes: military
authoritarianism and a reformist government. 115 This oscillation proved the inability of
the Shah and his aides to handle the crisis and revealed the weaknesses of the Shah to the
opposition. Khomeini, on the other hand, gradually gathered a group of highly educated
and democratic individuals who helped him create the liberal rhetoric needed to win the
support of the middle class and even secularists in Iran. The strong endorsement of
influential thinkers and skilled orators such as Shariati also tremendously helped
Khomeini in garnering the trust of the middle class of Iran. 116
Ironically, Khomeini united incongruent paradigms at play before the Revolution to
target the Shah’s regime’s legitimacy. There were at least four paradigms of resistance
prior to the Revolution:
“Secular nationalists wanted democracy, rule of law, and empowered civil society, and a
market economy; religious advocates of modernization wanted a modicum of democracy,
within a reformed Shiism that would provide the society’s moral fiber along with a
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Id. at 387. (“The Shah swung from one extreme to another, invariably to disastrous result.
Khomeini, dangling a tactical but tantalizing democratic platform, used each of the Shah’s moves
to him own profit, ultimately convincing Sullivan that he would create a democratic polity in
Iran.”)
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Id. at 378. (“By the early seventies Khomeini had found supporters amongst secular intellectuals
as well…more than any other ideology, the writings of the likes of Al-Ahmad and Shariati
prepared the context for Khomeini’s leadership of the democratic movements.”)
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market economy…the third paradigm was promoted by radical Marxists, who wanted
modernization forced on society by the absolute power of a state controlled by their
“vanguard party,” a planned economy, and a Russian tilt in Iran’s foreign policy…A
separate paradigm, critical of modernization and modernity and rejecting the desirability
of both, came notably in the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini.”117
Khomeini became the leader of the Iranian movement, uniting proponents of each
paradigm who became convinced that Khomeini would be the messiah advancing each of
their causes. Khomeini’s exile helped tremendously in creating an image of an idol and a
messenger that would ultimately return with a miracle to transform and revolutionize
political order, an order that had dominated Iran for 2500 years of monarchy. 118
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Id. at 435-436. Milani continues: “The paradox of the fall of the Shah lies in the strange reality
that nearly all advocates of modernity formed an alliance against the Shah and chose as their
leader the biggest foe of modernity”, Id.
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The Shah liked to emphasize that he was a successor of 2500 years of monarchy in Iran.
Eventually in a flamboyant yet highly controversial ceremony in 1971 he celebrated the 2500
years of monarchy in Iran. The excessive amount of money squandered in the ceremony is widely
believed to have had an everlasting impact on the society, which grew resentment towards the
Shah and his court’s unnecessary extravagance, Id. at 322-323.
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III. Legalizing the Revolution: Drafting

A. Battle of Drafts
1.Paris Draft
The draft of the constitution has undergone a long intellectual journey from the Paris
version to the version published for comments. One can see the gradual Islamicization
process as the Islamic forces became more powerful. The first versions did not contain
“subject to Islamic laws” in many clauses. Later on however, not only was this phrase
added to many of the Articles of the Constitution but also the Principle of Guardianship
of a Jurist became the most important Article of the Constitution.
The idea of writing a constitution for the Iranian Revolution arose when Khomeini was in
Paris. He called up one of his aides, Dr. Hassan Habibi, to prepare a draft of the
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constitution. Dr. Hassan Habibi received his PhD in Law and Sociology from the
University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne. Later, in February 1957 Khomeini expressly
and publicly talked about drafting a new constitution for the revolution. According to
Seyed Sadegh Tabatabi, brother of a daughter-in-law of Khoemini, it took a few weeks of
night and day work until the first draft was prepared. Khomenini also approved the draft,
which was also sent to receive feedback from a few other religious authorities. According
to Ayotallah Yazdi, the draft sent to other religious authorities contained remarks and
comments of Khomeini on its margins. 119
The first draft of the constitution stipulated a position for a prime minister and a
president. It also designed a Council (which was called the Council of Guardians) similar
to the Constitutional Council of France to ensure the constitutionality of the enacted
legislations. The similarities with the French Constitution stirred controversies among
conservatives and religious authorities that denounced the new constitution as highly
inspired by Western ideas. Interestingly enough, the first draft did not contain the very
controversial principle of Velayate Faghigh (Guardianship of a Jurist). This principle—
later added to the Constitution—states that an elected Islamic jurist should govern and
guide the main affairs of the republic. We will talk about this principle later in depth.
2. Tehran Draft
Parallel to the constitutional drafting endeavor that started in Paris, in Iran a group of
lawyers and scholars started to prepare a draft. This group was more inclined to the Azadi
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party (liberal party) and in addition to the French Constitution, was influenced by the
constitutions of Soviet Union, Algeria as well as by the Universal Human Rights
Declaration. There were 6 people who started to seriously engage in drafting the
constitution: Dr. Hassan Habibi (who previously came up with his own draft in Paris),
Dr. Mohammad Langaroodi, Dr. Lahiji, Dr. Minachi, Banisadr and Dr. Katooziyan. This
draft also was seen by Khomeini and was approved by him. This draft was published by a
widely published newspaper at the time (Keyhan) and was later submitted to the
Assembly, which was responsible for finalizing the text of the Constitution. This draft
had seven sections: 1) General Principles and Objectives (11 Articles) 2) Ownership (11
Articles) 3) People’s Rights (35 Articles) 4) Legislative Branch (31 Articles) 5)
Executive Branch (46 Articles) 6) Judiciary Branch (15 Articles) 7) Guardians of the
Constitution (10 Articles). 120 It is worth mentioning that the current Constitution of Iran
has a structure very similar to this draft.
The latter draft of the constitution is derived from three main paradigms: Western
republicanism, reformist approaches to Islam, and anti-colonialist ideology. The two
pillars notable in various principles were the governance of people and protecting the
boundaries of Islam. In other words, people should govern themselves through
democracy but within the ambit of what’s permissible in Islam.

3. Transition Government Draft
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http://www.feirahi.ir/?article=158
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Following the Revolution, the idea of constitutional writing was one of the priorities of
Khomeini. In his appointment letter of the head of the transition government, he set out
the details of a special assembly for constitutional drafting. Following the Revolution, a
council was established in order to plan and regulate the transition from the old system to
the new government. One of its mandates was to establish an assembly for constitutional
drafting. The Assembly was eventually constituted and reviewed the Paris and Tehran
Drafts along with other countries’ constitutions, which it received from various
consulates in Tehran. The Assembly mainly took into account the Paris draft yet with a
major revision. Ezatolah Sahabi, a member of the Assembly explains this revision thusly:
“In the Transition Government, a Council was established which bore the title ‘Council
of Revolutionary Proposals’ over which my dad presided. Under his supervision we held
a few sessions regarding this Constitution….Mr. Habibi’s draft [Paris Draft] was
proposed. They made a few changes to it. The major change that I remember was that
they reduced the authorities of the President and expanded the authorities of the Prime
Minister. They believed that Mr. Habibi’s draft was influenced by the French
Constitution of the fifth republic, which De Gaulle had it ratified in 1985. The power of
the President was very expansive whereas the Prime Minister’s authority has been
decreased. The president was not in charge of the parliament. The president was elected
directly by the people whereas the prime minister, who was elected by the parliament,
was in charge of the people. Otherwise, they did not modify the draft until the draft was
introduced to the Council of the Revolution.”
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The Transition Government Draft differed from the Paris and Tehran Drafts in that it was
mainly influenced by the presidential system and the drafters were inspired by the 1905
Constitution of Iran among other sources.

4. Revolutionary Council Draft
Later the Transition Government Draft was submitted to the Revolutionary Council for
consideration. A major shift happened in the approach to constitutional writing in the
Revolutionary Council. A leftist approach was infused into the prepared draft of the
Transition Government, which was thought to be too liberal. For example in the
Transition Government Draft, ownership was linked to labor (Lockean notion), which
faced resistance in the Revolutionary Council.
Another important revision was adding “pursuant to Islamic guidelines” almost at the end
of each article of constitution. At this stage, the Constitution underwent an Islamicization
process. This draft was later sent to Khomeini for his approval.
Khomeini commented on 6 articles of the draft, however, he eventually accepted the draft
version in three points but not in the rest. The three points he raised was on 1) the
requirement of being Shiite and male for nomination to presidency (in the draft it only
mentioned “Muslim Iranian” as a requirement) 2) the design and format of the national
flag 3) minority rights in regions of Iran where they hold majority. Interestingly enough,
Khomeini did not raise any issue regarding the Guardianship of a Jurist Principle
(Velayat Faghigh) in his comments.
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Subsequently, the draft was published in a newspaper. Khomeini called for opinions and
comments on the draft. In a subsequent speech this is how he framed his call for
comments on the draft:
“Right now every sector and all religious authorities and Islamic intellectuals should
review this law and should comment…..on the Islamic Constitution only those who know
Islam should comment and not foreign intellectuals…..we all have the right to comment
on this constitution and you religious jurists have more right to comment…Those who
know Islam and like Islam should endeavor more and should be at the forefront.”
Subsequent to this call for comments, many organizations, parties, individuals and even
lay persons started to comment on the draft. Some groups even came up with their own
draft of the constitution. Each group approached it from its perspective. For example,
Islamic jurists were worried that the constitution did not sufficiently account for Sharia
(Islamic laws). Leftist groups found it to be too liberal.
Khomeini remained silent about the specifics of the draft. However, he commented on
several occasions emphasizing the interplay between Islam and republicanism. He stated:
“But the republic (aspect) has the same meaning given in other parts of the world to this
term. But this republic is based on an Islamic Constitution, which is Islamic law. What
we mean by Islamic Republic is that the conditions pertaining to election and its
execution should be based on Islam. But, people should elect and the form of the republic
is the same as it is elsewhere.”
Khomeini never mentioned anything about the Guardianship of a Jurist Principle in this
time. However, many of the Islamic jurists came out as opponents of the draft
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constitution because it was not sufficiently Islamic for them. Among them was Ayatollah
Montazeri who suggested that the principle of Guardianship of a Jurist to be added to the
constitution. He sums up his position as follows “the constitution should be drafted in a
way that the Islamic Jurists become pivotal for the Government and play a major role in
(enacting) the laws. However, in the current draft they do not have such a role”. He later
on became the president of the Assembly of Constitution Experts, the body responsible
for finalizing the text of the Constitution. Not surprisingly, his ideas became very
influential in this Assembly. Interestingly enough, several years later he was
marginalized and subject to house arrest because of his opposition to the Government.
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B. The Assembly of Constitutional Experts
The Assembly of Constitutional Experts was a body responsible for discussing and
finalizing the text of the constitution. The people elected its members with the total
number of 75 representatives. This was the first election after the Iranian Revolution.
(However, one should bear in mind that the first popular voting happened a few months
after the revolution. Khomeni ordered that a general voting be held so people could
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convey their opinion about the type of government they want via ballots. In this general
voting, 98% voted yes to the “Islamic Republic of Iran”. )
The Islamic groups and specifically those who had the support of Khomeini won the
majority of the seats. In fact, some other groups did not even obtain one seat in the
Assembly. Fifty eight elected representatives in the Assembly were Islamic jurists with
different levels of Islamic education. Other groups, which experienced a drastic defeat
including leftists, liberals, nationalists and seculars, objected to the result of the election.
A few groups wrote letters to Khoemini laying out the various violations that happened
during voting. None of the objections led to any result. The Assembly started its work
and finished reviewing the draft after three months (with several nudges from Khoemini
who wanted the Constitution to be delivered to people as soon as possible.)
The most controversial Article of the Iranian Constitution was the one stipulating the
Guardianship of an Islamic Jurist. Practically, this principle sets out the underpinning
legitimization narrative of the Iranian Constitution. The text in 1978 draft was as follows
(it was later amended in 1989):
“In the time that the Shia’ 12th imam is absent, in the Islamic Republic of Iran the
guardianship and leadership of the people rest on an Islamic jurist who is just, pious,
aware of current affairs, courageous, a skillful manager whom the majority of people
recognize and accept as their leader. In case no Islamic jurist holds such a majority, the
Supreme Leader or the Council of Leaders consisting of several high standing Islamic
jurists will be selected pursuant to the Article 107 of the Constitution.”
The current version of the principle is as follows, subsequent to the 1989 amendment:
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“In the time that the Shia’ 12th imam is absent, in the Islamic Republic of Iran the
guardianship and leadership of the people rest on an Islamic jurist who is just, pious,
aware of current affairs, courageous, a skillful manager whom will be selected pursuant
to the Article 107 of the Constitution.”122
As mentioned earlier, Ayatollah Montazeri was the head of the Assembly. He had an
undeniable role in the inclusion of the Guardianship of a Jurist Principle in the
Constitution. In an extensive research Mohsen Kadivar analyzed the intellectual journey
of Ayatollah Montazeri from the Assembly until his final apology for inclusion of the
Guardianship of a Jurist Principle in the Constitution. 123 He believes the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic provides less restriction for the Supreme Leader compared with the
1905 Constitution’s limitations of kingdom. 124
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The current version of the Article 107 is as follows:
“(1) After the demise of Imam Khumayni, the task of appointing the Leader shall be vested with
the experts elected by the people. The experts will review and consult among themselves
concerning all the religious men possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In
the event they find one of them better versed in Islamic regulations or in political and social
issues, or possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications
mentioned in Article 109, they shall elect him as the Leader. Otherwise, in the absence of such a
superiority, they shall elect and declare one of them as the Leader. The Leader thus elected by the
Assembly of Experts shall assume all the powers of the religious leader and all the responsibilities
arising therefrom.
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The idea of Guardianship of a Jurist comes from Khomeini and Ayatollah Broujerdi. The
idea interjected in the Constitution by Ayatollah Montazeri was to frame the
legitimization paradigm of the Constitution based on Islam. His ideas could be classified
intro five categories according to Kadivar:

1. Guardianship of a Jurist: The purpose of inclusion of this Article in the Constitution
was to provide legitimacy to the Constitution and the newly built regime via an Islamic
jurist as the head of the state.
2. Ideologist: the head of the state is the leader of the Islamic ideology as well.
3. Appointment: the head of the state (Islamic jurist) is appointed by God because of its
qualification. In other words, its legitimacy is derived from God and Islam and not the
people.
4. Consolidation of powers: Even though there will be three distinct powers, but they all
perform under the supervision of the head of the state (an Islamic jurist).
5. Mandate of Execution Guardianship of the Jurist: The head of the state should have the
power to supervise implementation of Islamic rules in the society.

Another important factor in the drafting of the Iranian Constitution was the influence of
communist ideas. The main inspiration was from analogy between the Supreme Leader
and the main ideologue within a communist party. This is how Ayatollah Montazeri and
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Ayatollah Beheshti reasoned in the Assembly in favor of the Guardianship of a Jurist
principle (Ayatollah Montzeri narrates):

“In the Assembly of (Constitutional) Experts, Ayatollah Beheshti and I argued that for
example in the Soviet Union if they want to govern, because they want to implement the
communist ideology, they select a person who is an ideologue and an expert on
communism. We have the same argument when it comes to Islamic issues, a selected
person should not only be an expert on Islamic issues but should be superior in
knowledge compared to the rest of the people. He has three obligations: he should govern
the Muslims’ affairs based on Islamic Law; he should guide Muslims as an Islamic jurist
with followers; and finally he has the adjudicative authority. Therefore, he should be the
most knowledgeable person in the field and should be the most pious Islamic jurist.”
During the Assembly sessions, two strands of thoughts concerning the Principle of
Guardianship of a Jurist were discernible. One group including the president of the
Assembly (Ayatollah Montazeri) believed that God (Shâre) has appointed the Valiye
Faghih. The other group believed that people elect the Valiye Faghigh. In other words,
the source of legitimacy was controversial. However, this controversy was transient,
because both sides agreed that Khomeini was the person who held both popular support
and the Islamic legitimacy necessary for the position.
Discussions in the Assembly of Constitutional Experts also showed an inherent tension
between two principles embodied in the Constitution. One was the idea of a Guardianship
of a Jurist. Another principle, however, was based on the notion that people should
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govern themselves. For instance in session 33 of the discussions, Mr. Khademi stated,
“governance is only for God”125 This was in sharp contrast with, for instance, Mr. Morad
Zehi (representative of the province of Sistan and Baloochestan) who suggested that
every aspect of the governance should be based on people’s votes and that the
Constitution should have a council-based approach with a “bottom-up” structure meaning
that every council member should be appointed based on popular vote. 126
The tension reached its peak in the discussions about Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution:

Article 5: Article 5 (1979 Edition): In the Islamic Republic of Iran, during the absence
(ghayba) of his holiness, the Lord of the Age, May God all mighty hasten his appearance,
the sovereignty of the command [of God] and religious leadership of the community [of
believers] is the responsibility of the jurisprudent who is just, pious, courageous,
knowledgeable about his era, and a capable administrator, and is recognized and accepted
by the majority of people as the leader. In case no jurisprudent receives such a majority,
the leader or the Leadership Council, consisting of qualified jurisprudents, as mentioned
above and in accordance with Article 107, assumes these responsibilities.
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Detailed Discussion of Assembly of Constitutional Experts (Soorate Mashroo Mozakerat Majles
Baressi Nahai Ghanoon Asasi Jomhori Islami), Sessions 32 to 50, pp. 944-945, available at
http://www.majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/pdf/tadvin_qaanoon_asaasi/qaanoon-e_asaasi-2.pdf
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Detailed Discussion of Assembly of Constitutional Experts (Soorate Mashroo Mozakerat Majles
Baressi Nahai Ghanoon Asasi Jomhori Islami), Sessions 32 to 50, pp. 981-983, available at
http://www.majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/pdf/tadvin_qaanoon_asaasi/qaanoon-e_asaasi-2.pdf
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Article 6: In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the country’s affairs must be administered by
reliance on the public vote, and through elections. These will include the election of the
president, the deputies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles), the members of
the councils, and other such institutions, or through a referendum in such instances as are
determined in other articles of this document. 127

In discussions of these proposed articles, several representatives opined in order to
delineate where the line should be drawn between the Islamic aspect of the Constitution
and its democratic function. Below are the main points as raised by each representative:
Mr. Moghadam Maraghei:
“’Islamic Republic’ consists of two words, Islam and Republic. ‘Islam’ is the substance
and the frame is republic. . .we are not passing law for today only. . . Imam Khomeini
was exceptional. . .how can we assure we have a similar leader such as him in the future?.
. . Islam is eternal. . .Islam’s power is in its core and laws do not give it power. . .another
point is that if we change the foundation of our government which is based on popular
vote to faghih’s [Islamic jurist’s] governance, then this will impact other articles in this
Constitution and we should change them all…then we will become an institutional
assembly not a constitutional assembly. . .” 128
Mr. Beheshti:
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Translations of Articles 5 & 6 have been adopted from World Intellectual Property Organization,
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf
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Detailed Discussion of Assembly of Constitutional Experts (Soorate Mashroo Mozakerat Majles
Baressi Nahai Ghanoon Asasi Jomhori Islami), Sessions 1 to 31, pp. 373-376 available at
http://www.majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/pdf/tadvin_qaanoon_asaasi/qaanoon-e_asaasi-1.pdf
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“it is correct that Islam does not need any Constitution. . . but the Constitution of this
society and this Revolution needs to rely on Islam. . .if our Assembly does not change or
reform anything in the substance of the Constitution then we are not a constitutional
assembly. . .Is Article 5 intended to negate popular vote? Is Article 5 intended to negate
freedoms? Is Article 5 intended to give the governance to a certain group and a certain
class? For instance, are you saying [because of Article 5] the prime minister, president,
and ministers should not be clerics? Never. Show me where in this Article [Article 5] you
find this meaning?. . . we emphasized in the text that ‘recognized and accepted by the
majority of people as leader’ means that no one can impose himself as leader. . . on the
people. . . then why is there such a principle suggested to be included in the
Constitution?. . .you (the people) shouted they wanted independence, freedom, and
Islamic governance. . . if our future government should be Islamic republic, then the
system and its leader, and its core should be put on the shoulders of those who can serve
as models in all aspects, personal, political, familial, and social, in terms of their
understanding of Islam and their commitment to Islam. . .the idea that we give all
authorities with no limits to the populace. . . is not consistent with the Constitution and
our idea-based (maktabi) system because people during the Revolution and in their first
referendum said Islamic Republic. . .”129
Mr. Sahabi:
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Detailed Discussion of Assembly of Constitutional Experts (Soorate Mashroo Mozakerat Majles
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“this is a very important principle and will create a revolution in the society, do not let it
pass without proper discussion. . . [after Article 5 was passed and in discussion of Article
6] Article 5 is a principle on governance and supervision of Islam or in other words
Guardianship of a Jurist principle and all here accepted it. The principle of popular vote is
another issue and these two principles cannot negate each other.” 130
Mr. Mir Morad Zehi:
“[Unlike Mr. Beheshti] I do not think that we have a principle in Islam that every
framework has been dictated by Islam. . . I believe governance has been vested by God in
the people. . .I think given the fact that we passed Article 5, other principles including
those reflected in Article 6 are not automatically abrogated. . .the right to govern is not
something that we can simply ignore and the value of popular vote is not only in electing
the president. . .”131
Dr. Ayat:
“the notion of national sovereignty, the notion of popular vote do not mean that popular
vote can lead to whatever result. If people vote that a certain person should be a slave this
vote cannot be accepted because this is tyranny based on the majority because many
personal rights are inalienable meaning that a person him or herself cannot waive them let
alone the majority of people. In many instances we see that popular vote is put in direct
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contrast with the Guardianship of a Jurist principle. Faghih is not a specific person. These
are descriptions similar to where we say for example that the president should be Iranian
and then you say that we violated national sovereignty [because we ascribed a feature to
the presidency . . . in the principle I call velayat faghih [Guardianship of a Jurist] we said
that the criteria is a vote by the majority of the people. . . therefore Article 5 that he [Mr.
Mir Morad Zehi] thinks is against popular vote is in fact an emphasis on popular vote.”132
Mr. Khameini:
“in this principle [as it is written – which was changed based on Mr. Khameini’s
suggestion] the center of the rule is ‘administration of the country’ which should be done
based on popular vote but this administration of the country which is a general concept
will be interpreted with what follows which is ‘in the form of referendum – election
and…’ In other words, the scope of this Article will be limited i.e. opinion and
supervision of the people will be only limited to these few examples and this Article [the
way it is written] does not add anything new and does not establish any principle –
because these things existed before – but then [this Article] will limit our hands in the
future and we cannot designate new ways of popular intervention and participation in the
future, and therefore it is better if we add this sentence to the Article ‘and other examples
which will be described in other articles of the Constitution.’” 133

132

Detailed Discussion of Assembly of Constitutional Experts (Soorate Mashroo Mozakerat Majles
Baressi Nahai Ghanoon Asasi Jomhori Islami), Sessions 1 to 31, p. 405 available at
http://www.majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/pdf/tadvin_qaanoon_asaasi/qaanoon-e_asaasi-1.pdf

133

Detailed Discussion of Assembly of Constitutional Experts (Soorate Mashroo Mozakerat Majles
Baressi Nahai Ghanoon Asasi Jomhori Islami), Sessions 1 to 31, p. 407 available at
http://www.majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/pdf/tadvin_qaanoon_asaasi/qaanoon-e_asaasi-1.pdf

63

As it is shown in the discussion above, none of the proponents and opponents took the
view that popular vote should categorically be rejected. Although there were considerable
disagreements among the representatives, it is important to note that even proponents of
Guardianship of a Jurist discussion did not view it or envision it as a replacement for
popular governance. For some of them this principle was the framework to protect the
‘excesses’ of popular voting. For others, the fact that the leader itself would be appointed
(indirectly) by popular vote signified that it was not in contradiction with the principle of
popular vote.

IV. Reassurance of Revolutionaries: Establishing

Unsurprisingly, many groups contributed to the downfall of the Shah’s Regime. Similar
to other revolutions in history, each group had a different view of the future of the
country and its constitution. Yet, it was Khomeini’s narrative that eventually prevailed
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amongst competing prescriptions for the post-revolution Iran. As we discussed,
Khomeini’s early and tenacious resistance to the Shah as well as his exile played a
critical role in creating his charisma for the revolutionaries. Yet, the question remains
how Khomeini managed to create the new order and to constitutionalize his charisma, to
borrow Ackerman’s terminology. 134 The bedrock of Iran’s constitutionalism today rests
on the early developments following the Revolution. Three factors contributed to the
establishment of the revolution and fostered Iran’s constitutionalism: 1. Building a
network of supporters, 2. Establishing a supreme leader position as the ultimate arbiter of
the political system and 3. Creating tension between the presidential position and the
supreme leader position. These three factors developed against the backdrop of several
very important historical events in Iran including the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War.
A. Network
Before he left Iran, the Shah desperately decided to appoint a long dissident of his,
Shapour Bakhtiar, as the prime minister in the hope that Bakhtiar’s reforms would
alleviate the revolutionary fervor of the populace. 135 Coming from the nationalist party,
Bakhtiar immediately lost the party’s support when he agreed to serve as the prime
minister in that tumultuous time of popular revolt. 136 Upon approval of the new
administration from the parliament, Khomeini quickly reacted. He ordered the
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“He [Bakhtiar] ordered the release of all political prisoners and the dismantlement of SAVAK
[Iran’s notorious intelligence agency], began a review of all important contracts, refused oil sales
to Israel and South Africa, and declared he would make major cuts in military and nuclear-plant
expenditures.” KEDDIE, supra note 9, at 238.
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government strikers to disrupt the governmental affairs and even prevent the new
secretaries from entering their offices. Khomeini effectively paralyzed the ordinary
administration of the government. However, the army was still cracking down on people
in the streets.137 Bakhtiar requested to meet with Khomeini in Paris in order to find a
solution to the impasse the country was facing. With victory in sight, Khomeini did not
want to reconcile with Bakhtiar. He sent a message indicating that he would meet
Bakhtiar only if he resigned from the Prime Minister position. Khomeini knew any
meeting with Bakhtiar might convey his recognition of Bakhtiar’s Government and
indirectly of the Shah’s reformist move. 138 This meeting never happened. Nevertheless,
Bakhtiar eventually allowed Khomeini to return to Iran from exile only to witness a
massive marching of people welcoming him back.139
Upon his return to Iran, Khomeini made a heated speech and after a short period of stay
in Tehran, he moved to Qom, implying that he did not have any desire to rule. 140 In that
speech, Khomeini famously stated that he would “designate a government with the
support of this nation” and that he would “throw a blow at this government”. 141 This
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The Shah’s armed forces were not ready and equipped for internal upheaval. Iran’s army was
designed to project an image of regional power. This unreadiness resulted in several bloody
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gesture has remained a normative power in the hands of those who believe Khomeini’s
goal was not to govern but leave it to the people to decide. Only a few days before his
arrival, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan to the prime minister position of a
transitional government. Bazargan and his government enjoyed the full support of
Khomeini. 142 Mehdi Bazargan received his education in France, belonged to the
nationalist party, and was a practicing Muslim. He was appointed to the Provisional
Government only twenty days after the departure of Shah from Iran.143 Some believe his
appointment served as a conciliatory effort to reconcile between diverse groups that took
part in the revolution144 while it helped to stave off potential US intervention. 145 Also,
Bazargan could fill the void in the managerial skills of clerks who never ruled. 146
Soon, Iran had two governments: Bazargan appointed by Khomeini with the consultation
of the Revolutionary Council and Bakhtiar appointed by the Shah and approved by the
Parliament. Each government had a different constitutional legitimacy narrative.
Bakhtiar, did not want to link his government to the falling Shah’s legitimacy. He,
therefore, believed that his legitimacy was coming directly from the 1905 Constitution.
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Bazargan, however, declared that it was Khomeini’s decree that granted him the
constitutional legitimacy. Bakhtiar’s vision was to re-vitalize the 1905 Constitution,
which he believed rested on the symbolic role of the King in the political system and on
parliamentarism, rule of law and secularism. 147 Bakhtiar’s political vision was not
appeasing to Khomeini who wanted to create a new political order. Khomeini struck the
last blow against Bakhtiar by wresting his last winning card out of his hands, the army.
Khomeini requested the army to side with the people and stop killing their brothers while
calling the suppressions in the street contrary to the Sharia. On the 22nd of the month of
Bahman (February 11th, 1979), the army decided to remain ‘neutral’ between
governments and retreated to its barracks. Three generals of the army submitted their
resignation to Khomeini. 148 In the afternoon of that date, people heard this from the radio
“this is Tehran, you hear the true voice of the Iranian people, the voice of
revolution…”149
While the Provisional Government was taking care of the day-to-day management of the
country, Khomeini expanded and fortified his network. He created a network of Friday
prayer preachers in mosques throughout the country and appointed the head of the
television and radio organization.
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guaranteed that his ideas were channeled to the people in addition to the traditional
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sermon channel delivered at mosques. This way, he could supervise and control the
administration of affairs by the Provisional Government. Khomeini was wary of the
economy too. He instituted several organizations in order to assist low-income families,
to reconstruct the damaged parts of the cities, to run properties left by the Shah regime
and to develop infrastructure in rural areas of the country. 151 Khomeini also created a
militia to act as his armed forces. In May 1979, he issued a decree establishing a special
force, known as the Revolutionary Guard, to protect the revolution and to report to the
Revolutionary Council. 152 Due to its appeal to the revolutionary, the Guard quickly grew
from 6,000 men at the beginning 1979 to 30,000 men by the end of that year. 153 154
An important step in safeguarding the revolution happened a few weeks previous to this
time in Paris. Khomeini—in the name of the people’s support for him and pursuant to the
religious right—ordered that that a council, called the Council of the Islamic Revolution,
be established. The Council consisted of a disproportionate number of Islamists with no
representative from the leftist camp. The original mandate for the Council pivoted around
conducting preparatory work for establishing a transitional government. However, later
151
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the Council increasingly gained power. As the events were unfolding, the Council
assumed more tasks, and, therefore, acquired more discretion in the post-revolution
affairs: It became the legislative branch of the revolution before the first parliament was
established. It developed ‘committees” under its control to combat anti-revolutionary
forces. It conducted the referendum on the new format of the new government,
commonly refereed to as the Islamic Republic Referendum. It reviewed and revised the
constitutional draft. And finally, upon resignation of Bazargan, assumed administrative
responsibilities until the election for the first president. The Council had a vital role as the
backbone and ‘think thank’ organization during the transition period. A group of likeminded members of the Council with views similar to Khomeini’s steered events towards
a form of government that converged with Khomeini’s ideals.
Only two weeks following the victory of the revolution, a group of Islamists with close
ties to Khomeini, formed a party, called the Islamic Republic Party. 155 Khomeini
remained aloof from forming any party or affiliating with any party including the Islamic
Republic Party.156 Formed by staunch supporters of Khomeini, the Party gained attraction
amongst the people. In the first day alone, more than eighty thousand people rushed to
register as members of the Party. 157 In the early days of the revolution, the Islamic
Republic Party played an important role in settling the narrative of the Islamists while
gradually and surely attacking other narratives including those of nationalists and leftists.
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The Party also started a newspaper, Islamic Republic, which is still published today. By
1981, and after acerbic defeats for the other groups, the Party held power in all three
branches of government. 158 Soon the Party became factionalized, diverging on critical
economic and military issues. In May 1987, Khomeini intervened to issue a decree to
abolish the Islamic Republic Party. Since then, Iran has never had strong parties again. 159
Various groups and forces took part in revolting against the Shah’s regime. Yet, despite
the variety of these groups and the nuances in their thinking, three categories could be
distinguished: leftists, Islamists, nationalists. All three of these groups were at play in the
early days of the revolution. Leftists were constantly criticizing the pro-western approach
of the Provisional Government and the constitution. They boycotted the constitutional
election paving the way for the landslide victory of the Islamists. 160 However, they
marked their critical impact on the revolution with a series of demonstrations that helped
the hostage crisis take place in Iran. The left camp struggled for its existence for a few
years. Some leftists engaged in guerilla warfare and killings in order to curtail the
expansion of the Islamists. Some of them engaged in peaceful opposition spreading their
words through press and publications. However, eventually all leftist parties were either
eliminated by the Revolutionary Guard, or declared illegal (such as the longest lasting
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leftist party the Tudeh Party) by 1983. 161 By then, only the Islamic Party and Freedom
Party were allowed to legally operate in Iran. 162
As discussed earlier, Islamists formed an Islamic Republic party, which was believed to
enjoy the support of Khomeini. Soon, they became the mainstream voice criticizing the
Provisional Government and acted independently of the Government through the Islamic
Council and its Committees. During the Bani Sadr presidency, as we will discuss, this
party also took the lead in pressing the government. Through the Party, Islamists
centralized their efforts and expanded their network. As novices, they also learned
collectively how to be involved in politics and use it to advance their goals.
Nationalists or liberals had a short political life span that significantly dwindled with the
resignation of Mehdi Bazargan’s government in the wake of hostage crisis. Bazargan
along with two other political thinkers established the Freedom Party of Iran163 before the
revolution in 1961.164 The Freedom Party believed in constitutionalism and also believed
in the role of religious values in governing. It seemed that at the onset, they shared some
leftist and anti-imperialist tendencies that they forwent after the early years of revolution
passed.165 The leaders and members of the Party suffered from torture, imprisonment and
suppression during the Shah’s period. After the revolution, they had momentum when
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Bazargan assumed the prime minister position for the transitional government. However,
their soft, tolerant, and liberalistic approach did not seem to capture the fervor of the
revolutionaries. Also, unlike the Islamic Republic Party, they did not engage in mass
recruitment. Instead, they aimed to act as a moderator of the revolutionaries’ desire to act
radically.
Tensions between the Freedom Party and the Islamic Republic Party culminated in the
clash that happened during the Hostage Crisis. While the Provisional Government started
to open new avenues with the US, the students stormed the American embassy, making
all the rapprochement efforts of Bazargan and his team futile. 166 Subsequently Bazargan
resigned because he stated that the country had a “thousand chiefs.” The Freedom Party
introduced candidates for the first parliament election. Several of the Party members
including Bazargan were elected. The clash between the Freedom Party and the Islamic
Party continued in the first parliament. The Islamic Party gradually gained the upper
hand, especially after the Freedom Party criticized the war with Iraq and requested that it
end following the re-capturing of the occupied territories of Iran.
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election. In 1987, based on an it has remained a marginalized and underground party with
seemingly little social base.
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The last bastion that helped Khomeini expand his ideas and network happened through
the Cultural Revolution. Again, similar to major events of the early years of the
revolution such as the establishment of the Islamic Republic Party hostage crisis,
Khomeini did not involve himself in the process. 168 Evidently, for Khomeini, the
revolution of Iran was a “revolution of values”.169 However, it was not until an initiative
by the Council of the Islamic Revolution that the cultural “purge” started in Iran mainly
at universities.170 It started because some leftists took refuge in university campuses after
they were expelled from their headquarters in the summer of 1979. 171

172 Instead

of

opposing the move, in a surprising turn, Bani Sadr endorsed a cultural revolution in
Iran. 173 Bani Sadr seemingly hoped that he could lead the cultural revolution in a
direction to him..174 Soon, however, it became apparent to him that given the organization
and the network of the Islamic Republic Party, his effort was destined to fail. 175 In 1980,
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IRAN:

Khomeini appointed seven-members mainly from the Islamic Republic Party to the
Council of the Cultural Revolution. The universities were shut down for three years and
many leftists and liberal professors and students were dismissed while the curriculum was
going through the process of “Islamization”. 176Again, this event marked another victory
for Islamists, which allowed expanding their network and views through universities. 177

B. Ultimate Arbiter
Khomeini’s idea on the Guardianship of a Jurist is usually recognized as the flagship
theory behind the Islamic Republic of Iran and its theocracy. The broad interpretation of
the theory bestows ruling, managing, and even legislating functions on the supreme jurist
of the Islamic Republic. This interpretation clearly falls under the theocracy category in
which a religious leader dictates all aspects of its citizens or to use a better word,
governed subjects. The world has witnessed such regimes in Europe during Medieval
times and Caliphates during the Islamic empire heyday. The text of the Constitution also
gives a strong impression that its mandate is to establish a theocracy. In the introduction,
the Constitution says that a fundamental characteristic of the revolution is its ideological
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and Islamic feature.178 Article 5 of the Constitution establishes that the supreme leader is
the successor of the sacred absent Imam of Shiism. Article 57 of the Constitution
declares that all three branches of the government perform under the supervision of the
supreme leader.
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Furthermore, Article 110 of the Constitution contains a long list

laying out responsibilities and authorities of the supreme leader. 180
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Yet, this picture seems to be simplistic when we plow through other provisions of the
Constitution as well as the unfolded events especially during the early years of the
revolution. For one thing, Khomeini’s idea of the Guardianship of a Jurist and of
statehood has fluctuated through time. In Shia’s tradition, ruling was a new phenomenon
with little scholarship or experience.181Khomeini started off his political dissidence by
simply attacking anti-Islamic elements of the Shah’s regime. 182 He wanted the sovereign
to respect Islamic law and abide by it. 183 However, it was not until exile that he
developed a seemingly endogenous political theory. 184
Khomeini had to bridge from the overly legalistic culture of Shiism to a political one.185
He gradually built the theoretical basis for this transition. 186 First, he proposed that

10. dismissing the President of the Republic, with regard to the best interests of the country, after
either the Supreme Court has issued a ruling convicting him of deviating from his legal duties, or
the Islamic Consultative Assembly, based on Article 89, has cast a vote against his competence;
11. pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, after
the head of the judiciary power has recommended such a motion.
The leader can transfer some of his duties and authorities to another person.”)
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governing was among the primary tasks of the Prophet. Traditionally, adjudication was
considered to be the only or the most important authority of the Prophet. Khomeini
enumerated three distinct authorities for the Prophet: 1) Messenger 2) Adjudicator 3)
Administer. For the first one, the Prophet solely conveys the message from God. Second,
the authority bestows the competency for the Prophet to adjudicate disputes between
people in a binding fashion. This authority continued via the Imams of Shia until the 12th
Imam, according to Shiism. In fact, one of the important legal sources for Shiism has
been the adjudication and judicial opinions of the 12 Imams. 187 The last authority,
however, was new to Shiism. By ascribing this authority, Khomeini endeavored to create
a fine line between those orders of the Prophet that were necessary for governing and
those judgments that came as a result of adjudication. This approach had two important
ramifications for the Shi legal tradition: first, it would allow explaining certain practices
and decrees of the Prophet Mohammad that seemed incongruent with main principles. 188
By following this approach, these outlier opinions would fall under the governing

(Madhab) in Islam which believes that Ali (Prophet Mohammad’s son-in-law) was the legitimate
successor of Prophet Mohammad. They believe that Ali was the first Imam. Shiism has also
different branches one of which is Shiia Isna Ashari, with the largest population in Iran and Iraq.
This group believes that there were 12 Imams in total, the last of which disappeared from the face
of the earth (Imam Mahdi). They believe Imam Mahdi will return. This school of thought believes
that, in addition to Quran and Sunna, the sayings (Hadith) and behaviors of these Imams are also
binding on Muslims. Therefore, the body of law created in Shiism is to some extent different from
Sunnism. One should bear in mind in Islamic law there is body of law pertaining to inferring
primary rules (Osul Figh). This requires a separate discussion but what is important for our
purpose is that the absence of last Imam, yet its presence in all times until he returns, plays a
crucial role in shaping Shiism political thought. The legitimacy of the supreme leader in
Khomeini’s view (valiy faghigh) comes from its alleged temporary succession for the 12th Imam.
CONSOLIDATION IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF SHI’ITE ISLAM
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authority of the Prophet not his adjudication competency. Second, Khomeini believed
that the governing authority of the Prophet was later designated to Imams and
subsequently to a qualified jurist of each era. This was the bone of contention with other
Shi jurists who, unlike Khomeini, did not believe that the governing authority was
assignable to any person after the 12th Imam. This was the backbone of the Guardianship
of a Jurist theory. 189
At first, Khomeini’s efforts were centered on arguing that the Prophet enjoyed another
bestowed authority, meaning governing. Later, during the establishment phase of the
revolution, Khomeini placed the administrative or governing authority on top of the
adjudication role by creating the concept of Maslehat or “expediency”. By that concept,
he was referring to state interests and it seemed that his theory was the first of its kind to
accommodate a main feature of modern statehood, the state of exception. In short, he
believed that expediency of governing could even suspend the primary rules of religion.
For instance, destroying a mosque is not permitted. Yet, if due to state interest, a mosque
needed to be torn down, through the notion of expediency emanating from the
administrative authority, the mosque could be destroyed. 190 This idea embodied the
Expediency Discernment Council, which came to existence by Khomeini’s decree in
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1988. In the order, Khomeini stipulated, “…the state’s interest is a critical issue, ignoring
of which would sometimes result in a defeat of dear Islam.” 191
There is a wide spectrum of ideas and speculations about what Khomeini had in mind on
ideal governing. In fact, these speculations have remained until today and have caused
several factions to emerge within Iranian politics. We hear many labels for Khomeini’s
political theories, from sultanism,

192

the king philosopher regime,

193

to religious

democracy. 194 Yet, scholars tend to focus more on the events, Khomeini’s speeches,
violent incidents during the post-revolutionary period, and the suppression of dissidents
including the left. Nevertheless, focusing on the Constitution, as keenly observed by
Abrahamian, “…the whole constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic was modeled
less on early caliphate than on de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic.” 195 The role of the supreme
leader was more of an arbiter than an authoritarian dictating all governmental affairs and
policies. Khomeini also carried out his position as more of a political arbiter and a
conciliator for political disputes than a rigid fundamentalist waiting for opportunities to
implement another rule of Islam. This partly explained why “Khomeini, despite his
denials, was highly flexible, remarkably innovative, and cavalier toward hallowed
traditions.”196 197 For him, the leader was a political position rather than a religious one.
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Any analogy of the post-revolution regime of Iran to the Papacy in the Middle Ages, the
caliphate era, or the Sultan dynasties does little to help in comprehending the complicated
and ambiguous political ideas of Khomeini. This constitutional role did not come solely
as a result of Khomeini’s thoughts and theory about the Guardianship of a Jurist. In fact,
he never proposed the theory to be included in the Constitution. It was others who
pursued it.198 Furthermore, in the tumultuous times of the early years of the revolution
and given his charisma, Khomeini was referred to for thorny decisions related to
incidents such as the hostage crisis, the Bani Sadr presidency, war. This tradition has
continued to this today with noticeable nuances that the supreme leader position was
designed to break political gridlocks by acting as an ultimate arbiter.

C. Emergence of Dualism
Vali Nasr in his book, Forces of Fortune, argues, “Iran’s constitution is an unhappy mix
of Islamic government and popular sovereignty…” 199 and continues to assert that “Iran
does not have one government, it has layers of government.” 200 These are true statements,
yet it seems that it is precisely the “unhappy mix” and “layers of government” features
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that have kept constitutionalism alive in Iran. These features have remained more or less
consistent in the past 35 years since the Iranian Revolution.
The early days of the revolution established what soon became a critical feature of the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitutionalism. Unlike Nehru and Mandela, Khomeini
recused himself from day-to-day operations of the revolution and delegated it to the
Provisional Government (executive arm) and the Revolutionary Council (legislative arm).
His efforts established himself and his role as the grand strategist and the conciliator for
the revolution. This was discussed in the previous section. Another important feature of
constitutionalism in Iran was developed due to the dualist nature arising from the
tensions between the Supreme Leader role and the elected government officials. The first
tension arose between the Bazargan government and the Islamic Republic Party. The
Bazargan provisional government was not elected by the people but by the Revolutionary
Council. Yet, Bazargan’s government was a harbinger of dualism in Iran. 201 After a long
and attritional battle with the Islamic Republic Party on various aspects of governing, he
finally voiced his frustration: “unless this [duality of power] is rectified and resolved, the
mere election of a president and election of [parliamentary] representatives will not be
enough.”202
By duality, Bazargan was referring to the mini state, which the members of the
Revolutionary Council had created. 203 Bazargan was clearly unhappy with the clerics
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gradually taking over political matters. Islamists and Khomeinists had the control of the
Revolutionary Council and started to implement executive affairs through their
committees.204 They also gradually dominated the judiciary system and executed many of
the political and army officials of the Shah’s regime.205 Bazargan finally resigned. The
resignation was quite likely due to the duality of the government. Yet, it came at a critical
turn in the post-revolution phase: the hostage crisis. While Bazargan was seeking
rapprochement with the US, “Students following the Line of the Iman” stormed the US
embassy and took the staff of the embassy hostage. As far as we know, Khomeini did not
know of this plan and did not approve it at the beginning. 206 Yet, seeing the wave of
support for it, Khomeini turned it in his favor and quickly capitalized on this event. 207
This incident had at least two important impacts in the history of Iranian
constitutionalism: It established the supreme leader as the “to-go-person” for critical
decisions of foreign policy. Second, it weakened the liberal groups and those who had
wanted to improve the relationship with the West for a long time. In fact, it created a
narrative for those who supposedly stood for “independence” versus those who were soft
and preferred to rely on Westerners. The legacy of hostage crisis has yet to be explored
but it further entrenched the built-in dualism of the Iranian new political order, but this
time in the foreign policy arena.
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To the surprise of many Khomeini accepted Bazargan’s resignation after a meeting with
Revolution Council members. 208 Almost ten years later, Khomeini mentioned in a letter
that he was against the appointment of Bazargan but he was a good person. 209 It was
possibly a political maneuver especially since at the time the Freedom Party was
marginalized and under constant attack by the Islamists. 210 Bazargan’s government was a
“good government for a wrong time”. 211 During a tumultuous time of post-revolution, the
government was soft while unaware of the ways to establish and grow its social base. 212 It
could not compete with the networking capability of the Islamists.
Bani Sadr’s story was different from Bazargan. He won the election with a landslide
(76% of the votes) while running as an ‘independent’ candidate. The Islamic party
suffered a major defeat in the election. During the early years of the revolution, Khomeini
forbade members of the clergy to run for executive posts. When it came to the first
presidential election, Khomeini explicitly banned clerics from running for presidency.213
This helped Bani Sadr in his landslide victory as Khomeini banned Ayatollah Beheshti, a
leading figure of Islamic Party, from running for the presidency.214
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Bani Sadr was an obscure figure. His name definitely was not among the top
revolutionaries.215 However, people gradually learned about him when he appeared as a
member of Khomeini’s entourage after his return to Iran. He met with Khomeini for the
first time when he was in Iraq. 216 He quickly turned himself into a political and religious
thinker by publishing two books and supporting Shariati, a leading and widely popular
theorist before the revolution. 217 He belonged to a group of non-clerics who studied
outside of Iran. Before the presidency, Khomeini appointed him to the Revolutionary
Council.218 He was an economic secretary in the Bazargan administration 219 and also an
opponent of the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist in the Constitutional Assembly.
Yet, it was widely believed and uncontroversial that Khomeini supported Bani Sadr in the
first presidential election. Khomeini’s alleged support acted as a critical factor in his
victory in the election.
The support for Bani Sadr continued. Khomeini appointed him the head of the
Revolutionary Council and the army. 220 Yet, disgruntled Islamic Party members quickly
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recovered and aimed for a sweeping victory in the parliament. They succeeded and won
the majority seats in the first parliamentary election in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Bani
Sadr realized that the Islamic Party would try to contain his powers and limit his
authority. He first claimed the election was rigged. Later, he tried to avoid Parliament and
bypass it in any way possible. For instance, he would avoid signing bills into law albeit
the fact that in the constitution no veto power was stipulated for the president. 221
Bani Sadr clearly wanted to consolidate powers in his hands. His aim was to create a
presidential system, while other political bodies, including parliament, was of secondary
importance. His education in France and his encounter with the fifth republic might have
influenced his approach. Some believe it was his personality that steered him to vie for
more power.222 However, his tragic fate was predictable: unlike the Islamic party he did
not have a network or strong social base. 223 He had Khomeini’s support for a long time
but it proved not to be enough especially after the Islamic Party convinced many that
Bani Sadr was “incompetent.” Later, Khomeini swore that he did not vote for Bani Sadr.
His political demise also was due to his mistakes, his indecisiveness, along with two
major events: the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War. Eventually, Bani Sadr was
impeached and Khomeini confirmed impeachment by the Parliament. Bani Sadr’s fate
enfeebled the status of the presidency in Iran’s Constitutional culture. The army was also
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Towards the end of his presidency he had to resort to Mojahedin’s party and network. In fact, he
hid in their hideout in Tehran when opposition to him reached its peak.
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taken away from the president, following a controversy over Bani Sadr’s inactions in the
Iran-Iraq war.
Upon his assumption of the presidency, Bani Sadr showed determination to solve the
Hostage Crisis himself in order to establish his stature in the political scene of the time. 224
Previously as a member of the Revolutionary Council, he opposed the take-over of the
embassy.

225 Now,

as the head of the Council he wanted to take matters into his own

hands. However, in every move, Khomeini took sides with the students not with him.
Bani Sadr pursued a UN commission to visit Iran in order to meet with the hostages in
the hope that Iran could receive compensation for its grievances in exchange for the
hostages.226 Khomeini did not agree and a few student supporters of Bani Sadr left the
embassy.227 Bani Sadr had to give up on his plan. 228
With the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Bani Sadr devoted his attention to the war zones. For
him, victory on the battlefields would mean victory in the complicated politics in Tehran.
He wanted to garner all the credit for victories and did not like to share it with anyone
else. This is the reason behind his skepticism towards utilizing the Revolutionary Guards
as an organization with close ties to the Islamic Party. To this day, even among existing
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commanders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there is disagreement on Bani Sadr’s
wartime strategy, its benefits, its disservice and the intention behind it. 229 Yet, a major
defeat paved the way for the Islamic Party to further pound on their narrative: Bani Sadr
was incompetent.230
A final event struck the fatal blow to Bani Sadr’s political career. Bani Sadr publicly
denounced the handling of the hostage crisis. During his speech, violence broke out and
he ordered the police to arrest the Islamists. Khomeini intervened and ordered that a
reconciliation committee be established. He demanded both sides, meaning Bani Sadr
and the Islamic Party, stop fighting until the committee reached its decision. Khomeini
also banned them from delivering any public speeches and also interviewing until the
decision was announced. Bani Sadr did not wait for the decision and continued criticizing
his prime minister, Rajai, who had the support of the Islamic Party. Subsequently, his
newspaper was closed, the Parliament impeached him and Khomeini dismissed him from
the commander-in-chief position.231 Bani Sadr hid for a while until he left Iran in disguise
and went to Paris. With the political demise of Bani Sadr, the window for a powerful
presidency was closed for a while. The next presidents did not create major tensions. The
war had an important impact in marginalizing political life in Tehran. The devastation
and economic hardship imposed by wartime conditions did not leave much room for the
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political arena. It was not until the amendment of the constitution that we witnessed a
powerful presidency again. Dualism re-emerged again after Khomeini.

V. End of Charisma: Institutionalizing
The last years of Khomeini’s leadership were critical in shaping the Islamic Republic of
Iran as we know it today. Still, many ambiguities exist regarding the political incidents of
that period. This is partly because the events leading to the appointment of the successor
of Khomeini have remained confidential and controversial. It also has not been
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thoroughly studied, especially from a constitutional perspective. This period led to what
some scholars call Iran’s “second republic”, 232 borrowing the language from the phases in
French constitutional development. Whether Iran became more democratic and
“republic” after the succession phase remains highly controversial. This uncertainty
renders the analysis of the succession period necessary and vital for understanding the
nature of one of the most important political orders in the Middle East.

A.

Rift in Iranian Politics

The dismissal of Bani Sadr paved the way for the supporters of Khomeini and the Islamic
Republic Party to have a monopoly in Iranian politics. Unlike the first parliament, the
second parliament did not have members of parties which were on the opposite side of
the policies of the Islamic Republic Party. The National Party was found to be a heretic
party, the leftist parties were ousted from politics and the Freedom Party was
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See generally ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI, AFTER KHOMEINI: THE IRANIAN SECOND REPUBLIC
(2002). Some authors believe that the third republic started with the election of reformist
president, Mohammad Khatami, Ghoncheh Tazmini, Khatami’s Iran: The Islamic Republic and
the Turbulent Path to Reform (2009) (“Khatami’s election marked the beginning of the third
Islamic republic. Enthusiasm for the election must be understood in the context of the fundamental
social changes of the first and second republics. The first republic was formed in the immediate
aftermath of the 1979 revolution, and had at its core Ayatollah Khomeini’s use of social
mobilisation to unite the masses and guarantee the continuation of the state during the heady days
of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The second republic began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989 and
was principally guided by new economic realities and wider strategic considerations. The second
republic is associated with Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s eight-year presidency following
Khomeini’s death in July 1989.”
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marginalized following the impeachment of Bani Sadr. The election became a scene for
the Islamisists to compete against each other. 233 The second parliament election happened
when the eight-year Iran-Iraq war started.
War with Iraq had an undeniable impact on Iranian politics. Managing the war required
more homogenous elites. In other words, war paved the way for a more top-down
authoritarian political order. The isolated Iran faced a long and brutal war without having
significant support from the outside. 234 On the other hand, Iraq increasingly gained
logistical and military help from different countries including, towards the end of the war,
the United States.235 This further cemented the anti-Western and anti-imperialist attitude
in the mind of Khomeini and his supporters. As some scholars noted, the anti-American
rhetoric of Khomeini became augmented, even more than that following the Hostage
incident.236
Managing the war on the one hand and ideological differences on the other finally created
friction amongst the supporters of Khomeini and Islamic Republic Party members. Soon,
233
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United States supported Iraq diplomatically and militarily for most of the Iran-Iraq war: “The
United States helped Iraq by maintaining its arms embargo on Iran, protecting shipping in the
Gulf, providing weapons and intelligence, and mounting a counterterrorist campaign against Iran.
The tilt toward Baghdad was briefly countered by an Israeli-encouraged arms deal in which
Reagan Administration thought it was providing some spare parts and TOW and HAWK missiles
in exchange for help in the release of Americans held hostage by Hizballah, Iran’s surrogate in
Lebanon, and the promise of talks with so-called Iranian ‘moderates.’”, Judith Yaphe, Changing
American Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, in THE IRAN-IRAQ W AR: NEW INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 178, 178 (Nigel Ashton & Bryan Gibson eds., 2013).

236

Mehran Kamrava, Khomeini and the West in A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO KHOMEINI 156-157
(2014).

91

divergent views emerged in regard to important issues in the politics of Iran. One fault
line was the level of states’ intervention in the economy. A group believed in the minimal
intervention of states considering the sanctity of private property in Islam. The other,
including the prime minister, Mir Hussain Mousavi, advocated the expansive state
control of the economy especially during the difficult time of war. 237 Another critical
issue pertained to the role of Islam in the society. It was clear for the supporters of
Khomeini following his teachings that Islam should be at the center of the new regime.
Divergent views, however, resurfaced regarding the nature of Islam and its role in society
and politics. One faction favored the traditional view of Islam, which included
implementation of Sharia rules and continued support for the link between the bazaris
(businessmen) and clerics. They, however, disapproved the exportation of the Iranian
revolution to other countries. The other faction had a more radical view of Islam: they
were not fans of bazaris, they supported the exportation of Islam and the Iranian
Revolution to other countries, and they believed in the role of the poor and dispossessed
class in the Islamic Revolution. Rightly so, the first group is identified as the right and the
second group as the left in Iranian politics. 238 Hosein Bashiriyeh, a political sociologist
calls this “cleavage” a friction between “populist Khomeinists” versus “Conservative
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MEHDI MOSLEM, FACTIONAL POLITICS IN POST-KHOMEINI IRAN 47-48 (2002).

238
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Traditionalism”. 239 The difference between these two camps also existed in their
theoretical approaches to the interpretation of Islam. The conservative group espoused
traditional methods in construing Islamic texts. The other group advocated the dynamic
interpretation, which meant Islamic rules should be updated in accordance with the needs
of each period of time. 240 This rupture in the Islamic bloc, eventually led to the
dysfunction of the Islamic Republic Party. Eventually in 1987, Rafsanjani and Khameini
asked Khomeini to dissolve the party to which he agreed.
As a result of this rift in Iranian politics, Khomeini became the arbiter for political fights
between these two major factions. Interestingly enough and especially towards the end of
his life, Khomeini was siding more with the left (populist Khomeini) camp against the
traditional Islamists. 241 One of the first instances of Khomeini’s intervention dates back
to 1981 where the Council of Guardians vetoed a land reform bill on the ground that it
would violate the right to private property. Rafsanjani, the Parliament Speaker at the
time, asked Khomeini to intervene in the matter because of the principle of expediency in
Islam. Khomeini refused to address the matter directly but in a letter he praised the
dynamic approach to Islam that allows for Sharia to be compatible with the needs of a
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society. 242 In another important example, the parliament sought Khomeini’s advice
because of a gridlock deriving from political rivalry between the president, Khamenei,
and the prime minister, Mousavi. The president believed that the constitution granted him
the power to appoint or dismiss a government. Therefore, he argued that it was him who
should have the authority to nominate a prime minister. The parliament, with the left
holding the majority, did not like Khamenei’s choices for the prime minister position. As
a result, Khamenei took no action for a while until the members of the parliament wrote a
letter to Khomeini asking him to intervene in this matter. He did not address the matter
directly but praised Mousavi, the Prime Minster, in his letter. As a result, Khamenei,
despite his preference, nominated Mousavi. 243 The last occasion that is worth noting
relates to an unprecedented letter Khomeini wrote to the president, Khamenei, warning
him that he did not understand the theory of Guardianship of a Jurist (velayate faghih).
This letter came against a backdrop of another tension between disgruntled conservatives
in the Council of Guardians and the left camp in the government. Khamenei in a Friday
prayer speech stressed that the government should stay within the boundaries of Islamic
law. However, subsequently, Khomeini wrote a harsh letter rebuking Khamenei. In the
letter Khomeini emphasized that the state can override Sharia rules if they are contrary to
the interests of the country or Islam. 244
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“The state that is a part of the absolute vice-regency of the Prophet of God is one of the primary
injunctions [ahkam-e avvaliyeh] of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions,
even prayers, fasting, and haj’. The ruler is authorized to demolish a mosque or a house that is in
the path of a road and to compensate the owner for his house. The ruler can close down a mosque
if need be, or can even demolish a mosque that is a source of harm if its harm cannot be remedied

94

In summary, the tension between conservatives and populists is critical in understanding
the politics of Iran after Islamists took control of the leadership. This dynamic between
these two groups played a definitive role in the succession period following Khomeini’s
death. Furthermore, many political factions that later surfaced in Iranian politics also
came as a continuation of this first rift in Iranian politics. 245 Bashiriyeh believe that two
pivotal issues fostered the political-ideological space in Iranian politics: one pertains to
the dispute over economic regulation and the other is related to modernization and
liberalization.246 However, as noted by him, neither of these political factions has created
a stable party system in Iran so far. 247 In the next section, we will focus on the succession
crisis and the constitution amendment.

without demolition. The state is empowered to unilaterally revoke any Shari’a agreement that it
has conducted with people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country of
Islam.”, Id. at 74.
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revolution and to reconstruct the country as a stable, modern Islamic nation. Democratic
reformism has more specifically advocated the establishment of a stable, modern Islamic
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B. Succession Crisis
The succession phase in the Islamic Republic of Iran started with Iran’s acceptance of the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. This Resolution called for the end of
the Iran-Iraq war. Khomeini was not in favor of ending the war and he famously
mentioned that he finally agreed to drink the “poison chalice” in his long declaration
about the end of the war. 248 His decision came after reportedly a series of sessions and
letters by army generals warning him about Iran’s diminishing military capacity and
Iraq’s acquisitions of new weapons and more sophisticated tactics. 249
The end of the war created some apprehension regarding the Khomeini’s succession. It
coincided with Khomeini’s worsening health condition. He was eventually hospitalized
in 1988.250 Important incidents following the end of the war all have direct and indirect
reverberations on the succession matter. One critical development was the clash between
Khomeini and Montazeri. Ayatollah Montazeri was an important figure in Iranian politics
and a former student of Khomeini. He was a staunch supporter of the theory of
Guardianship of a Jurist and an influential force behind its incorporation in the
Constitution of 1979. In 1985, he became the official deputy of the supreme leader and
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Khomeini’s successor. More importantly, he was a leading Islamic jurist, a qualification
that all Khomeini’s inner circle lacked. However, Montazari was never amongst the main
aides of Khomeini and never attempted to become a member of Khomeini’s operation
wing. 251 Increasingly his role became that of a moral authority without any systemic
influence on any decision-making.252
It was perhaps because of Montazeri’s aloofness from the operational circle of elites that
he became increasingly vocal in criticizing many aspects of government. 253 He publicly
voiced his dissatisfaction on issues ranging from managing the war to day-to-day
operation of the government. 254 During 1988, he delivered lectures in Qom criticizing
that the country had become a dictatorship and the political parties were not influential in
the politics.255 However, his two letters to Khomeini shockingly revealed the differences
between the two and put an end to his participation in the governance of Iran. In those
letters, Montazeri harshly criticized the practice of the mass execution of dissidents of the
Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the practice of exporting the revolution to other
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countries. 256 Following the unsuccessful attack by the opposition group, People’s
Militants, from the Iraqi borders, around 3000 political prisoners were executed in the
span of only two months.
Montazeri’s open and unprecedented criticism on the one hand, and the arrest of his
family members in conjunction with espionage allegations, 257 made it easy for contenders
to eliminate this last barrier to the successor position to Khomeini. Following these
incidents, the Council of Experts signaled to Montazeri that he should resign from his
deputy and successor position to the supreme leader. He resigned and returned to Qom to
focus on his teaching. Nevertheless, he became the voice of opposition in the years to
come leading to his house arrest. Many of the influential figures in the Reformist camp
that surfaced following the election of Khatami, were students or supporters of
Montazeri’s ideas. It is still controversial whether it the plan was concocted by the inner
circle of Khomeini with the help Khomeini’s son or whether it was his personal choice
since the letters were unprecedentedly harsh and personal. In those letters Khomeini
called Montazari a “gullible” and easily influenced person who had been played by
liberals and foreigners. He disowned him by declaring that from the beginning he was
opposed to his appointment as the deputy to the supreme position but did not want to
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interfere with the affairs of other institutions. 258 He even went further to say that he was
against the appointment of Bazargan as well as the election of Banisadr. 259
Khomeini made two moves both of which had important international reverberations
during his last year partly in order to signal to Montazeri and the traditionalists that the
Islamic Republic of Iran should be active in exporting Islam and its revolution. First he
sent a letter, in January 1989, to Mikhail Gorbachev inviting him to join Islam because,
he declared, communism soon would belong to the museum of history. Gorbachev
wittingly responded that he felt honored to be the only leader to whom Khomeini wrote a
letter.260 In the second move, in February of 1989, he issued a fatwa (religious verdict)
calling Salam Rushdi, the author of Satanic Verses, an apostate and invited Muslims to
fulfill the execution wherever they found him. 261 In all these moves, Khomeini was
flexing muscles against opponents to further establish his position, which can be called
the interest-oriented approach to governance. His idea became embodied in the extra
constitutional Expediency Council, which eventually entered the Constitution in the
amendment of 1989. We will discuss this matter in the next section.

258

“I swear to God that from the start I was against choosing you as my successor, but at the time I
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With the removal of Montazeri from the political scene, the floor became open for others
to vie for the position. On the other hand, it created a void in the politics of Iran. The
characteristics required under the Constitution for the supreme leader position fitted
Khomeini. Per the Constitution, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran
should be a source of emulation (Marja Taghlid) as recognized by the people. However,
after the assassination of Ayatollah Beheshti, and Ayatollah Motahari by opposition
forces, defrocking Ayatollah Shariatmadari by Khomeini and the dismissal of Ayatollah
Montazeri, no leading Islamic jurist remained in power to be a viable successor to
Khomeini. The Constitution predicted establishment of the council of leaders in case the
people found no major Islamic Jurist that matched the criteria stipulated in the
Constitution. However, this alternative was not appealing to the ruling elites of Iran, as
they feared chaos and disarray in the leadership and in people’s obedience of its decrees.
Therefore, Khamenei (president), Rafsanjani (house speaker), Mousavi (prime minister),
and Ardebili (head of the judiciary) wrote a letter to Khomeini asking him to issue a
decree regarding the amendment of the Constitution. 262 The 1979 Constitution of Iran did
not stipulate any process by which the Constitution could be amended. In response to the
request, in 25 April 1989, Khomeini wrote a letter establishing the Constitution Review
Council comprising of 25 members, 5 appointed by Parliament and the rest appointment
by himself.263
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MOIN, supra note 248, at 293.

100

In the next section, we will take a closer look at the major amendments of the
Constitution in 1989 including the clear shift toward political leadership rather than
religious leadership.

C. Constitution Amendment
It is ironic, and might run the risk of being an overstatement, yet the constitutional
amendments of 1989 were a major step in de-Islamicization of the Islamic Republic of
Iran.264 The most important amendment of the constitution pertained to the qualifications
of the supreme leader position. In line with Khomeini’s late ideas and in a far cry from
his earlier theory of the Guardianship of a Jurist, 265 266the supreme leader position became
predominately a political post not a religious one. This development came as a result of
Khomeini’s shift on the “Islamicity” of the regime to “interests of Islam and country”. 267
This shift by Khomeini was also a move to flex his muscles towards the conservativetraditionalists who believed in Islam being the ultimate arbiter not the Valyeh Faghih
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However, the name of the parliament was changed from National Assembly to Islamic
Consultative Assembly in the amendments.
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“The participants in the May 1989 debate on constitutional amendments had at their disposal a
decade of statements, speeches, and fatwas (religious edicts), by Imam himself. Having articulated
contending visions of authority, each side could draw on this rhetorical reservoir to make a case
for or against a particular amendment. The institutionalists skillfully mined Khomeini’s utilitarian
legacy to justify the controversial proposal to separate the position of marja’ from that of faquih.”
BRUMBERG, supra note 253, at 144.
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The change had the strong support of Khomeini: “I…from the very beginning…insisted that the
conditition of the marja’yyat was not necessary…a just mujtahed who is confirmed by the
honorable experts… will be sufficient.”, BRUMBERG, supra note 253, at 148.

267

“On the contrary, Khomeini played a direct role in the overall process of revisiting the
Constitution. He not only issued instructions for amending critical articles such as Article 109 …,
but justified these and other changes by invoking the concept of Maslahat, or expedient interests.”
BRUMBERG, supra note 253, at 145.
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(supreme leader). However, in the amendment process conservatives favored the removal
of the pre-requisite of Marjayiat (source of emulation) for the supreme leader position. It
was because they finally saw the possibility that a person from their camp, Khamenei,
had a chance of becoming the next supreme leader. Also, the Revision Council removed
the basis of the supreme leader position on the popular-charismatic ground by amending
Articles 5, 107, 109. 268 The election of the leader became a task by an assembly of
experts elected by the people. However, the authority given to the supreme leader
position became even more expansive, for instance the appointment of the head of
judiciary, head of the radio and TV organization, responsibility for coordinating the
relations among three branches of government and setting the general policies of the
regime.269 It should be noted that the scope of authority of the Assembly of Experts was
also expanded. The amendment bestowed a wider supervisory discretion for the
Assembly of experts allowing them to also check the political capacity of the leader.
Based on the Constitution, the Assembly has the authority to dismiss the leader if he
lacks any of the qualifications mentioned in the Constitution. In practice, however, this
Assembly never became powerful and has remained under the control of the supreme
leader. In short, the amendments were not a shift towards republicanism either. In fact it
further empowered the supreme leader position in Iran vis-à-vis other institutions. Yet,
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BRUMBERG, supra note 253, at 147. (“The original version of Article 5, it will be recalled,
stipulated that the “leadership” was to “devolve upon the just and pious faqih,” who was
“recognized and accepted as leader by majority of the people.” The latter provision celebrated
Khomeini’s charismatic link to the people. However, the new version of Article 5 dropped all
references to any popular acclamation of the Leader.”
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ARJOMAND, supra note 242, at 39.
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the efforts cemented a dualism or schism in Iranian politics between the supreme leader
position and the president creating a rather unique system.
Another critical feature of the amendments to the Constitution was its centralization of
powers. The prime minister post was eliminated to further strengthen the presidency. 270
The Revision Council rejected the idea of having a council of leaders instead of a single
leader. It was also decided that a single person would run the judiciary for 5 years with
the possibility of extension with the appointment of the supreme leader. Under the old
Constitution, a five-member council was in charge of the judiciary. This same shift
applied to other, less important, positions. For the director of the Radio and TV
Organization, it was decided that a person be in charge instead of a council and that the
supreme leader appoint the head of that organization. The centralization came as a
reaction to the dysfunction as well as friction between posts stipulated in the 1979
Constitution that had paralyzed the country at times. 271
Another amendment pertained to the Expediency Discernment Council (Expediency
Council hereafter), which was already operating. This body came into existence as a
result of friction between the parliament and the Guardian Council. As we noted, the
Guardian Council was comprised of the majority of conservative-traditionalists while the
left camp had the majority of parliament (especially the third parliament.). This created
gridlocks and tension between these two legislative bodies. By the Constitution, the
270

Article 113 declares that the presidency is the next highest official position after the supreme
leader position.

271

“The weakness of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of vaguely
defining the roles and responsibilities of the various centres of power in the republic had been
evident at least since the political struggle in 1980-1 between President Bani-Sadr and Prime
Minister Rajai and his IRP-based clerical support.”, EHTESHAMI, supra note 232, at 34-35.
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Guardian Council holds the review authority of laws passed by parliament in terms of
their compatibility with Islam and the Constitution. Over the course of the years, the
Guardian Council blocked more than 40 precedents of legislation voted by the
Parliament. 272 The House Speaker, Rafsanjani, asked for Khomeini’s intervention on
several occasions which mostly ended with implicit support for the parliament initiatives.
This friction eventuated in creating an extra-constitutional body by the decree of
Khomeini, which was supposed to act as an arbiter between the parliament and the
Guardian Council. This body, the Expediency Council, operated for more than two years
and in the amendments of 1989 it finally entered the Constitution. 273 Article 112 lays out
the arbitral function of the Expediency Council in the new Constitution. Additionally,
Clauses 1 and 8 of the Article stipulate further (yet vague) responsibilities for the
Council. Clause 1 declares that the supreme leader designate the general policies after
consultation with the Expediency Council. Clause 8 delegates the task of resolving
conflicts to the supreme leader through the Expediency Council in case tensions cannot
be resolved in other ways.
Adding an eternal clause was another noteworthy development in the constitution
amendments. In the last Article (177), certain aspects of the political order of the Islamic
Republic of Iran were declared unalterable through any amendment procedure of the
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EHTESHAMI, supra note 232, at 35.
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At times, the Council entered into lawmaking as well, a matter that instigated a letter to Khomeini
by members of parliament objecting to this practice. He responded emphasizing that the Council
could enter matters only if there is a difference between the parliament and the Guardian Council.
Ayatollah Montazer, another major theorist of Guardianship of a Jurist, opposed the very existence
of such a council: “[it] is an institute contrary to the Constitution which was set up owing to the
existing necessities and the war…in the future all affairs will be managed in accordance with the
constitution.”, Id.
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Constitution: content of principles related to the Islamic nature of the system, the Islamic
basis of all laws and regulations and faith-based principles and objectives of the political
order, the republican nature of the system, guardianship of a jurist, 274 the administration
of countries’ affairs based on popular vote and the official religion (twelfth Imam
Shiiam).
The politics involved in the amendment process are critical in understanding the amended
Constitution as well as the rise of Rafsanjani-Khamenei in the new political order of Iran.
In the deliberations, one heated discussion was related to the post of prime minister. The
right, not having the majority in the parliament, argued for the removal of the prime
minister position. Furthermore, the leftist policies of Mousavi’s Government during the
war further instigated their opposition to the necessity of the prime minister position. 275
In short, this debate was centered on presidential versus parliamentary government.
Members of the Review Council surveyed several other constitutions in the world,
including, ironically, the United States. 276 There were also disagreements on the scope of
the supreme leader’s authority. The left was worried that bestowing too much power in
the hands of one person would create a tyranny. The right, however, reiterated the need
for the country to have a person who has the final word. They also pushed for the word
“motlagh” (absolute) as the determination of the scope of the authority of the leader.
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Interestingly enough, the exact term “velayate faghih” as used by Khomeini is not included in this
Article. Instead a similar but rather vague notion is used.
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“…in terms of the distribution of executive power in the republic the failures of the successive
Mousavi government to solve Iran’s economic difficulties (thanks partly to the Guardian
Council’s opposition to the radical legislation proposed by Mousavi and supported by the Majlis)
provided further ammunition for those who advocated the abolition of the premiership.”,
EHTESHAMI, supra note 232, at 37.
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They wanted to make sure the leader has the absolute power in the system without any
restrictions.277They succeeded. However, those who believed in the presidential system
probably acquiesced because they calculated that the supreme leader position and the
president would balance each other’s authorities.
Rafsanjani, the House Speaker at the time and a close aid to the Supreme Leader, seemed
to have a different agenda. His political positions and ideas did not squarely match either
of the prevailing camps at the time. He can aptly be categorized as the pragmatic figure
of the revolution as he always has tried to remain allies with both sides of the political
spectrum. At the time of the succession, he was active and anxious to make the transition
smooth and to his favor. 278 He vociferously endorsed a very strong presidential system 279
while he pushed for a council of leaders instead of a single leader. 280 He was successful
in advancing his agenda on having a strong president but did not have any success in his
latter initiative, which was the elimination of a single supreme leader position. He, then,
put all his efforts into persuading others regarding the leadership of Khamenei. In his
calculation, Khamenei would never become the second Khomeini both in terms of his
political power and its religious stature. He was also sure that he could win the
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MOSLEM, supra note 237, at 84.
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For the detail account of the days of Khomeini’s passing see MOIN, supra note 248 at 299-313.
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“according to Rafsanjani, “We cannot choose a qualified executive but strip him of the necessary
powers. The current condition of the country calls for a strong executive branch.” He rebuffed the
dictatorship thesis of the left by pointing out, “Our country is not like the US; we have a leader
who would prevent such a dictatorship. Do not be afraid of a strong president. The likes of BaniSadr no longer exist in the country.”, MOSLEM, supra note 237, at 86.
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“Indeed Rafsanjani’s determination to create an independent executive was such that he had
initially proposed permanently replacing the position of faqih with a “Leadership Council.”,
BRUMBERG, supra note 253, at 146.

106

presidential race and become the first powerful president of Iran without power-sharing
limitations coming from the prime minister position.
Rafsanjani’s plan for the succession period worked. In a surprisingly smooth transition,
Khamenei was elected as the next leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. When the
Assembly of Experts was discussing the candidacy of Khamenei, Rafsanjani famously
told a story from Imam: “…we said to the Imam, if the need arose for a successor to you
we would have difficulties, because with the present constitution we could have a
leadership vacuum. He said that this would be the case since we had the right people.
When we asked who, he pointed to Mr. Khamenei.” 281 This story, which some find to be
concocted, was influential in the appointment of Khamenei.
The Assembly appointed Khamenei as the next leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The revisions of the Constitution, that had not yet been put to vote, were the guidelines
for the Assembly of Experts appointing the next leader. In other words, the appointment
was based on the qualifications discussed in the Revision Council. The new Constitution
was put on the ballot along with the presidential election. People approved the new
Constitution and Rafsanjani became the president. For the 8 years of his presidency,
Rafsanjani remained powerful. However, through time the supreme leader gained power
until he became undoubtedly the most powerful person in Iranian politics.
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MOIN, supra note 248, at 309.
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D. Asymmetrical Constitution
The Iranian Constitution, unlike what is generally believed, is not a homogenous
instrument. One could trace the various political thoughts paradigm in its texts. The
French draft (along with the Tehran draft) created the framework of the constitution. In
other words the structure of the constitution was designed during the stage of Paris and
Tehran draft constitutions. The liberal ideas of the Constitution at this stage are
noticeable in section three of the Constitution, which discusses the people’s rights. In the
Transition Government, a few leftist ideas were added to the text, which is traceable in
the property ownership part of today’s Constitution. Finally, Islamic ideas came in the
last stage, which culminated in Ayatollah Montazeri’s successful inclusion of the Velayat
Faghigh Principle (Guardianship of an Islamic Jurist) in the text of the Constitution. A
close analysis of the politics of Iran in juxtaposition with the development of its
constitutional shows us that Iran has vestiges of constitutionalism. This is critical in
understanding domestic politics as well as foreign policies of Iran.
As discussed above, the constitution of Iran ultimately morphed into a major dichotomy:
a supreme leader position which oversees and, to a certain extent, controls several critical
institutions such as the military, judiciary, and national television and radio; and the
presidency position which is directly elected by the people and runs the governmental
agencies and, to a certain extent, foreign policy. The constitutionalism in Iran, in fact was
reduced to these two institutions due to the fact that in the process of institutionalizing of
the constitution, the judiciary did not establish itself as an arbiter for constitutional
issues. In the United States legal system, for example, the well-known case Marbury v.
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Madison established what has become the robust judicial review of constitutional
matters.282 This process did not occur in Iran, partly due to the fact that the drafters of the
constitution modeled the Council of Guardians after the Conseil Constitutionnel
[Constitutional Council], a body to review proposed statutes by the parliament a priori,
prior to their signing into law by the president. 283 A few prominent legal scholars tried to
create a doctrine of constitutional review but it never became a systemic constitutional
review by the courts. 284 As a result, in the aftermath of the “charisma era”, the friction
between these two institutions, (the supreme leader and president) constituted what can
be called constitutionalism in Iran. The supreme leader selects the 6 Islamic jurists to be
members of the Council of Guardian (responsible for constitutional review of the
legislation) according to Article 91 of the constitution. 285 The president, on the other
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PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: M ARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICA
4-5 (1997) (“Marbury [case] shows us law’s role as a contingent political possibility. Law’s rule is
law’s victory over competing understanding of politics. These competing understandings have not
disappeared; they are never completely vanished. The rule of law is a way of managing conflict of
political perceptions.”)
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The Counsel was established by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (4 October 1958) which
aimed to expand the presidential power and to end the supremacy of the legislative branch that
have dominated the constitutional practice of France since 1870, EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME
COURTS AND J UDICIAL LAW-M AKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW 20 (1986). According to Article 58, the Council also supervises the election of the
President of the Republic to control the integrity and regularity of the election. The Council’s
review are either compulsory or options. It is optional where a proposed statute (or an international
agreement) is referred by a political authority or a certain number of members of legislative
bodies. It is mandatory, however, for institutional acts and the rules of procedure of the
parliamentary assemblies, Id. at 19-20.
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These scholars argued that constitution takes precedence over ‘ordinary’ laws of parliament and
therefore a judge can apply the constitution over other laws if the rules are in conflict. Nasser
Katoozian.
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“Article 91 (Council of Guardians): With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the
Constitution, in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic
Consultative Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be
constituted with the following composition: 1. six religious men, conscious of the present needs
and the issues of the day, to be selected by the Leader, and 2. six jurists, specializing in different
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hand, is responsible for “implementing the constitution and acting as the head of the
executive, except in matters directly concerned with the leader” pursuant to Article 113
of the constitution.

286

Therefore, the checks and balances, required under

constitutionalism, have been loosely achieved through this friction. In other words, the
constitution of Iran remain an incomplete (or unfinished) document–similar to many
other if not all constitutions—waiting to be completed. And, these two institutions are the
only ones capable of shaping the constitutionalism in Iran.

VI. International Agreements as a Balancing Factor
Iran has a long history of engagement with international law: from the Anglo-Iranian Oil
case in 1952 which paved the way for nationalization of oil to the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 whereby Iran reached an agreement with 6 countries
concerning its controversial nuclear program. Iran also complied with international law
on several occasions, most notably the recent dismantling of its nuclear centrifuges as
stipulated under the JCPOA.287

areas of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists
nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power.”
286

“Article 113 (President): After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the
country. His is the responsibility for implementing the Constitution and acting as the head of the
executive, except in matters directly concerned with the office of the Leadership.”
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One of the most important defining factors in Iranian politics was foreign policy and
engagement with other countries. This became ever more important in the postestablishment period given that Iran experienced a long war and was determined to break
from the isolation it experienced due to war and its foreign policy.
In addition to foreign policy objectives, much less discussed, is the effect of engagement
with international law in elevating the presidency vis-à-vis the supreme leader’s position.
In other words, the presidency under the constitution suffered from what we can call
‘deficiency’ in the authorities vested to its position especially vis-à-vis the supreme leader
position. Under the constitution, the supreme leader enjoys the hard power, inter alia, by
being the commander-in-chief of the military forces. On the other hand, the presidency
does have direct control over the military forces and as a result should resort to soft
power in order to balance the powers under the constitution. One of the most important
avenues of soft power in possession of the presidents has evolved to be their engagement
with international law.

1. Algerian Accords
In the aftermath of the Revolution, a group of Iranians belonging to what was called
Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line, took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran and
held hostage fifty-two Americans for 444 days from November 4, 1979 to January 20,
1981.288 This created a tremendous political backlash in the United States where it was
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felt that the United States could not protect its own people. 289 After a political battle
between the United States and Iran, the hostages were released and both countries entered
into a set of international agreements known as Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981. In
the aftermath of the hostage-taking, President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 on
November 14, 1979 in which he declared that he found “the situation in Iran constitutes
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy
of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.” 290
This state of emergency—which also resulted in the blockage of the Iranian government
assets—was never reversed.291
The Algiers Accords are the first pivotal international agreement Iran entered into to
resolve a crisis. The Accords, which was designed to settle the crisis, contained a set of
agreements consisting of the General Declaration and the associated Undertakings of the
United States and Iran, and the Claims Settlement Declaration.
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The Accords
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DAVID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE THE IRAN HOSTAGE AND AMERICA’S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH
RADICAL ISLAM 1-2 (2005). The hostage crisis ended right when Carter yielded the presidency to
Reagan. It was a very emotional moment for Americans when the hostages were freed in Algiers.
Warren M. Christopher who helped negotiate the settlement with the Iranian government stated
that it was a moving occasion for everyone when the hostages were released: “There were very
few people with dry eyes, and I was not among them,”Bart Barnes, Former Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, Who Negotiated Settlement to Iran Hostage Crisis, Dies at 85, THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
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available
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Even after the agreement reached between the United States and Iran in July of 2015, Barack
Obama extended the ‘emergency’ status because the US-Iran relationship “have not yet returned to
normal, and the process of implementing the agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 2011, is still
underway.” Obama Renews National Emergency on Iran, TEHRAN TIMES, January 14, 2017,
available at http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/410050/Obama-renews-national-emergency-onIran.
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established, among others, that the United States would not politically and militarily
intervene in internal affairs of Iran and the United States, and that certain frozen assets of
Iranian government would be transferred back to Iran. 293 The Accords also established an
unprecedented dispute resolution mechanism; a mechanism that, by some accounts, is a
grandfather of many of the later transnational dispute resolution mechanisms: “An
International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby
established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States.” 294
The Algiers Accords resolved Iran’s first major foreign policy crisis. It also legalized the
new normal between Iran and the United States: an emergency status where dispute
resolution mechanism is designed to settle legal and commercial disputes without the
need for political espousal. Further, Algiers Accords was reached when a domestic
compromise was needed since Bani Sadr, the president, was against the hostage crisis and
wanted the matter to be handled by the president office. Khomeini rejected this request
and asked the parliament to make a decision on this matter. Ultimately, the parliament
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Algiers Accords, 20 ILM 223 (1981); In spite of the commitment of the U.S. to unfreeze certain
properties, on March 26, 1981, a few months after the execution of the Algiers Accord, the United
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Article II of Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 ILM 223 (1981).
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appointed, Behzad Navai, to lead the negotiations for the settlement of the Hostage
Crisis.295
The Tribunal was established pursuant to the Algiers Accords. The agreement was
predicated on the release of the hostages who were held in Iran for 444 days. The United
States, in return, agreed to return Iranian assets and withdraw from the prosecution of
Iran in international courts on this matter. Following the agreement, the hostages were
released and $8.1 billion was transferred to an escrow account. Out of $2 billion of
unfrozen Iranian assets, $1 billion were also kept in a security account from which sums
awarded to US nationals by the Tribunal could be collected. 296 The main document
establishing the Tribunal is the Claim Settlement Declaration. Article II sets the scope of
the Tribunal:
“1. An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby
established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim
which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the
subject matter of that national’s claim, if such claims and counterclaims are outstanding
on the date of this Agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts,
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BAYRAM SINKAYA, THE REVOLUTINARY GAURDS IN IRANIAN POLITICS: ELITES AND SHIFTING 88
(2016). This was also a compromise for divergent foreign policy views: “Contrary to radicals,
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abroad.”, Id.
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contracts (including transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or bank
guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property rights…
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the United States and
Iran against each other arising out of contractual arrangements between them for the
purchase and sale of goods and services…
3.The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in Paragraphs 16-17 of the
Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981, over any dispute as to the
interpretation or performance of any provision of that Declaration.” 297
The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is rather broad. It includes sales of goods
and services, agency relationships, export and import, expropriation and state
responsibility, corporation-related matters and many more.
Through the establishment of Iran-US Claim Tribunal by the Algiers Accords, Iran
entered into a regular judicial contact with the United States. The body has been
responsible to handle commercial claims of the U.S nationals against Iran and of Iranian
nationals against the United States, which arise out of contracts, debts, expropriation, and
other measures affecting the property right of individuals. Approximately 3800 claims
were filed before the deadline stipulated, which was a year from the date of execution of
the Algiers Accords. 298
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2. Oil Platform Case
Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war a series of incidents occurred that created another
source of tension between Iran and the United States. The main attacks involved
destruction of two Iranian oil platforms in what the Reagan administration announced
was retaliation for the mining that damaged a U.S. navy vessel a week prior to that. In the
incident, at the order of Reagan, six American ships destroyed two Iranian oil platforms
which led to severe casualties. Iran announced that the two platforms produced 150,000
barrels per day.299
The attacks on the oil platform were the culmination of a series of clashes between Iran
and the United States in the Persian Gulf. These tensions were partly due to the change of
Reagan’s policy to take a more active role in the Persian Gulf and Iran-Iraq war.300 Iran at
the time decided not to escalate the situation. As a result of these confrontations,
Khomeini appointed Rafansani, who was a speaker of the parliament at the time, as the
acting commander in chief for the forces. Rafsanajni was a known to be a pragmatic
figure in Iranian politics and this move would de-escalate the situation. 301 Further, Iran
decided to pursue this claim before an international court. The case was ultimately filed
before the International Court of Justice in 1992. 302 In this case, Iran invoked the Treaty
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of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States
signed before the revolution to establish jurisdiction of the court. The treaty that was
never officially revoked by the parties, established jurisdiction for International Court of
Justice in Article XXI: “Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by
diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High
Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.” 303
The United States first invoked the treaty in the case it brought before the International
Court of Justice in connection with the hostage crisis. The court in the case found that:
“The very purpose of a treaty of amity, and indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to
promote friendly relations between the two counties concerned, and between their two
peoples, more especially by mutual undertakings to ensure the protection and security of
their nationals in each other's territory. It is precisely when difficulties arise that the treaty
assumes its greatest importance, and the whole object of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the
1955 Treaty was to establish the means for arriving at a friendly settlement of such
difficulties by the Court or by other peaceful means.”304
Iran and the United States reversed their positions on the validity and applicability of this
treaty in the oil platform case. In this case, Iran argued that the court had jurisdiction
pursuant to the 1955 Treaty. The United States, however, argued that the treaty and its

303

Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 284
U.N.T.S. 110.

304

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. US), 1980 I.C.J
3. (May 24) at ¶54.

117

reference to commerce would not include situations such as the attacks on the oil
platforms. The court upheld jurisdiction and ultimately ruled that the treaty would
encompass the situation before it as the word ‘commerce’ in the treaty cannot be only
restricted to ‘maritime commerce’ as argued by United States. 305 The court had to decide,
inter alia, whether destruction of the platforms could violate ‘freedom of commerce’ and
whether commerce’ was to be considered as ‘maritime commerce.’ 306

3. Investment Laws
The Iranian Constitution has serious limits on direct foreign investment. Article 81 of the
Constitution, which concerns foreign business stipulates: “Granting of concessions to
foreigners for the incorporation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce,
industry, agriculture, service, or mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden.” 307 The
broad language of the Article is quite discouraging for foreign companies hoping to
invest in Iran. Foreign companies have to establish subsidiaries in Iran because they
cannot be the majority shareholders. The Council of Guardians, which is the interpretive
authority of the Iranian Constitution,
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involved in commerce with the Iranian Government can be incorporated in Iran for the
purpose of their legal and operational activities. 309 Another major obstacle in the
Constitution concerning foreign investment is Article 44. This article defines the scope of
the state sector, which should be publicly owned. In practice, the expansive and wide
scope of this Article places many important sectors of the economy in the hands of the
Government. Article 44 paragraph II states:
“The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major
minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and large-scale irrigation
networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping,
roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the
State.”310
Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution poses yet another critical challenge for the Iranian
Government in the area of foreign investment. The Government has desired to transfer its
less lucrative businesses to the private sector so that better management would revive the
businesses. For this reason, starting in 2005 under the supervision of the Expediency
Council, the Iranian Government started to gradually transfer its businesses, including
banking and communications, to the private sector. 311
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Lastly, it is Article 139 of the Constitution, which is related to arbitration, also affects
foreign investment. Foreign investors, in general, are skeptical and reluctant to refer their
disputes to Iranian domestic courts and tend to prefer arbitration. Article 139 of the
Iranian Constitution, however, is a major obstacle in this regard:
“The settlement of claims relating to public and state property or the referral thereof to
arbitration is in every case contingent on the approval of the Board of Ministers, and the
Parliament must be informed of these matters. In cases where one party to the dispute is a
foreigner, as well as in important domestic cases, the approval of the Parliament must
also be obtained. Law will specify the cases which are considered to be important.” 312
There are other domestic provisions that are not friendly to foreign investment. For
instance, labor law in Iran, generally speaking, makes it difficult for employers to lay-off
employees.313 Furthermore, originally the tax imposed on corporations was 54%, and it
has been reduced to 25%. 314 Still, this might be high taxation for corporations, which can
choose to operate in countries with much lower income tax rates.
There are other obstacles in Iranian domestic law which makes foreign investment
difficult. Ownership of real property by foreign nationals requires a special process. 315
First, the local Registry Office should be adequately informed about the purchase. The
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transfer of ownership is then subject to approval by the office of Ministry of Foreign
affairs on the condition of the principle of reciprocity. 316
Following an eight-year war with Iraq, Iran decided to attract foreign investment in order
to rebuild and reconstruct its economy and infrastructure. This dire need coincided with a
surge of political strength from reformists that culminated in the election of a reformist
president in 1997. In a period of expansion in foreign investment from 1995 to 2007, Iran
drafted approximately 50 bilateral investment treaties (BIT) with both developed and
developing countries. Through this, Iran signaled its determination to attract foreign
investment to developed countries. In addition, Iran hoped to prevent and undermine the
effects of international sanctions with the help of its bilateral treaties with various
countries.
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are gaining increasing importance in international
law. BITs are, as some scholars believe, the product of fear of developed countries of
nationalization and expropriation. 317 Iran performed one of the earliest and significant
nationalization processes in 1951. 318 The United Nations General Assembly also
recognized this nationalization of rights of developing states. 319 This further complicated
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the scene for developed countries. This caused developed countries to search for and find
alternative ways to protect their investment and obtain proper compensation such as in
cases of expropriation. The first BIT dates back to 1959 between West Germany and
Pakistan and since then approximately 2600 BITs have been concluded between different
countries.320
Iran has been the subject of foreign investment for almost one hundred years. The past
investment agreements have created cynicism towards foreign investment among
Iranians. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly shows the overall
skepticism regarding foreign investment. One of the main concerns dealt with providing
concessions to foreign companies for an extended period of time as happened in the case
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

4. Iran Nuclear Deal and Its Legalistic Nature

Iran’s approach in its negotiations for the Iran nuclear deal was quite legalistic in nature.
Iran relied heavily on international law. It was Iran that suggested the Iran deal be
incorporated as a U.N. Resolution to give the deal legal force. From 2014 onwards, Iran
team benefitted from legal opinions of Mr. Jamshid Momtaz, a towering figure in
international law. Mr. Momtaz authored more than thirty books and academic articles and

each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means
suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State
may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full
exercise of this inalienable right”. Id.
320.
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was known in the international law circle. In 2014 he opined that “[t]he expectation that
the P5+1 countries could decide about this matter instead of the Security Council is not
logical. The Security Council is an independent institution which can adopt
resolutions.”321 He planted the idea that this agreement should have a legalistic nature
endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. Iran’s approach in the negotiation was very
legalistic trying to frame the agreement under international law. Javad Zarif who was the
lead negotiator on behalf of Iran also has a background in international law. From 2002
to 2007, he worked at the U.N as Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations.
In one interview he said that “I should not accept negotiations which, as their foundation,
have a violation [of] international law.” He repeatedly stated that “Iran is committed to
principles of international law.”322 Moreover, even though Iran strongly rejected the U.S.
invention of the “snap back” mechanism under the Iran nuclear deal, it ultimately
accepted it.323 Below is an analysis of the legal nature of the Iran Nuclear Deal.
What is known as the Iran Nuclear Deal is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), reached between the six countries (viz China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States as well as the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran
regarding Iran’s controversial nuclear program on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA was a result
of at least 20 months of negotiations which resulted in the initial Joint Plan of Action in
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November 2013,324 a framework deal in April 2015,325 and ultimately the JCPOA.326 The
JCPOA was endorsed by the United Nation Security Counsel Resolution (UNSCR) 2231,
which, inter alia, provided for termination of previous UNSCR’s resolutions imposing
sanctions on Iran and designated Iranian entities 327

subject to “snap back” of

sanctions.328 The “snap back” refers to an innovative method designed by the JCPOA
which will be triggered upon disagreement on compliance with obligations set forth
under the JCPOA by which “the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures,
shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting.” 329 Under this scenario, it takes
only a state with a veto power (United States, most likely in this case) to prevent
continuation of sanctions relief for the Iranian government, which inevitably result in
restoration of the UN sanctions regime.
The nature of the JCPOA has become ever more important as President Trump is
contemplating to impose tougher sanctions on Iran, 330 the U.S. has signaling that he
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would tear down the deal, 331 and the U.S. Senate passed a 10-year extension of some
existing sanctions and vowed to collaborate with the Trump administration on the
increase of sanctions on Iran. 332 These measures would be in direct conflict with the core
of the Iran deal—which was sanctions relief in exchange for Iran’s set back of its nuclear
program—and are endorsed by the idea that the deal is an unsigned, non-binding
agreement from which the United States can simply walk away. 333
The legal status of the JCPOA—the most important nuclear agreement in the post-Cold
War era and an exemplar of Obama’s foreign policy doctrine—is unclear.

Both

domestically and internationally, scholars, politicians and pundits have reached different
conclusions on the binding nature of the agreement. The fate of the JCPOA from the legal
standpoint will shed light on the legal developments pertaining to international deal
making in the post-Cold War era and would serve as a framework for future international
agreements. Both the dynamics of international relations and the paradigms of
international law have changed significantly since the Cold War era, and the JCPOA
would have undeniable and irreversible international legal consequences. Even if the
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parties may individually claim that the resulting agreement is non-binding, international
law may deal them a hand they do not expect, and force them to confront a reality that
they had not contemplated. The U.S. State Department in a letter opined that the JCPOA
is not a treaty and “the success of the JCPOA will depend not on whether it is legally
binding.”334 Time will tell; but in fact, not only success of the JCPOA but also Obama’s
approach to foreign policy by deal making might be dependent on the legal nature of the
JCPOA.

The Evasive Nature of the Iran Nuclear Deal

There is no consensus, however, as to whether the JCPOA is legally binding upon the
parties and is devoid of legal consequences. 335 At the time the agreement was taking
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shape, several U.S. senators,336 House lawmakers, 337 and some academics 338 have opined
that the agreement is non-binding and fragile. These constituencies portray the deal as
devoid of any binding obligations for the parties and untethered to international law
anchors.339 International sanctions and commitments made pursuant to the agreement can
be “snapped back” in a matter of hours, showing the fragility and non-binding nature of
the agreement.
The negotiators themselves had divergent views on the nature of the JCPOA. Secretary of
State Kerry believed that it would be no more than a political commitment. 340 His Iranian
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counterpart, Foreign Minister Zarif, contended that the deal would be binding under
international law and that any repudiation by the US would constitute a “blatant
violation.” 341 Russian officials suggested that a United Nations Security Council
Resolution incorporate the deal to render it secure, a position that was reflected in the
Joint Statement as well and was ultimately implemented. 342
The JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 countries is the most important nuclear
disarmament deal since the end of the Cold War, an accomplishment that would be
especially significant because the parties negotiated against the backdrop of a complex
web of sanctions stemming from three sources: the U.N. Security Council, the United
States, and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a cloud of uncertainty as
to the nature of the agreement: whether the agreement creates legal obligations under
international law and whether parties can breach the agreement without violating
international law. This piece will first examine the parties’ divergent views of political
commitments under international law, and then will enumerate the notable changes to
international law since the end of the Cold War.

A Souvenir from the Cold War: Political Agreements
congress-able-change-terms-iran-deal (“We’ve been clear from the beginning: We’re not
negotiating a, quote, legally binding plan . . . .”).
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The 1975 signing of the Final Act of the Helsinski Conference gave rise to the current
debate over non-binding international agreements. 343 Despite the great importance and
substantial length of that agreement, the signatories made it abundantly clear that they did
not intend it to be a binding treaty. 344 Writing afterwards, Oscar Schachter argued that
non-binding international agreements “can [still] be authoritative and controlling for the
parties,”345 and that it is wrong to believe that these “undertakings are illusory because
they are not legal.”346
The issue remains unsettled; some scholars contend that every commitment made by
states is inevitably legal, 347 and that states cannot shield their agreements from the
international legal regime. The International Court of Justice’s holding in Qatar v.
Bahrain serves as a good example of that theory: the Court held that the shared minutes
of a negotiation between Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia constituted a legally binding
agreement under international law. 348 Following the decision, a noted commentator
opined that the holding “struck the final death blow to [the idea that] . . . states c[ould]
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conclude agreements outside of legal order.” 349 This approach is re-enforced by the
notion that under international law, even unilateral statements by states can produce
binding obligations if it is clear with specific terms.350
Some scholars have distinguished between the binding nature of international agreements
signed between states and the legal consequences arising from such agreements. Anthony
Aust, then serving as legal counselor of UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote
in 1986 that “[t]here can be little doubt that the vast majority of informal instruments do
record agreements (using the term in its ordinary sense) between subjects of international
law; they may therefore not be devoid of all legal consequences.” 351
Other academics have criticized this approach, accepted the status of non-binding
political commitments in international law, and emphasized the importance of such
arrangements under international law. 352 According to proponents of this viewpoint,
political commitments have a rich historical basis and serve an important purpose in
international law.353 These academics identify an earlier case, Greece v. Turkey, as the
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natural counterpoint to Qatar v. Bahrain;354 In Greece v. Turkey, the International Court
of Justice held that a formal communiqué between the Greek and Turkish Foreign
ministers was neither binding on the parties nor sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Court.355
Scholars use several methods to determine whether an agreement is solely a political
commitment or an authoritative and binding treaty under international law. In particular,
they look at the language, context, and intent of states, as well as the substance of the
agreements.356 Yet, even for the proponents of political commitments, the line between
binding agreements and mere political commitments is unclear. 357
These criteria indicate that the JCPOA, irrespective of the text, cannot be a mere political
commitment. On the intent prerequisite, as discussed above, the parties do not agree that
the document is legally binding. This fact reduces the chance that the intent of the states
will be helpful in deciphering the text even if parties later state their intent retroactively.
It is highly doubtful that the text itself and the concern over words such as “will” versus
“shall” will offer much help:358 it has been the US position that language of this nature
will not determine whether a deal is a political commitment or a treaty. 359

354

See id. at 523, n.57.

355

Agean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 100-06 (Dec. 19).

356

See Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 352, at 516-25; Schachter, supra note 346, at 296-300; see
also similar criteria enumerated in the International Agreement Regulations Apr. 27, 1981 by the
State Department implementing the Case Act 1 U.S.C. 112b(a).

357

Schachter, supra note 345, at 297-298.

358

Anthony Aust, supra note 351 at 800-802. [“taken on its own, however, the title of an instrument
can be most misleading as to intention.”]

359

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 40 (2007). [“But it is also clear that in the
US practice use of non-treaty language does not necessarily preclude the instrument from being an

131

More importantly, the context of the deal implies that it cannot be a mere political
declaration, at least under international law. First, the JCPOA is designed to remain in
effect over twenty-five years, with no sunset date for certain monitoring measures. 360
Second, this deal is being negotiated against the backdrop of–and in order to resolve–
complex national, regional, and UN legal issues under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Even if the US can “snap back” sanctions at
will or under the JCPOA mechanism, it is not clear that sanctions will be as effective as
they were before. Further, the snap-back mechanism can be interpreted to mean that “the
American commitment is indeed binding unless and until ‘a significant’ breach has been
established.”361
Finally, the parties have taken actions under their respective domestic laws that suggest
that the deal might be more than a political commitment; For instance, the U.S. Congress
passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act in May of 2015, a compromise solution
between Obama and the Congress, in which agreement is defined generally “regardless of
the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether
it is legally binding or not.”362 The Act clearly avoided taking any stance on the nature of

international agreement if ‘the general content and context reveal an intention to enter into a
legally binding relationship.’]
360

Annex V (F), ¶ 26 (“The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other
JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates.”); Dan Doyner, Much,
Much More on the JCPOA, ARMS CONTROL LAW BLOG, July 15, 2015 (“I suspect that the U.S.
delegation was keen to not have a general sunset clause in the JCPOA, so that it could truthfully
tell Congress that the deal and at least some of its limitations on Iran’s nuclear program were
permanent.”)

361

Ackerman & Golove, Guest Post: The Lawless Presidency of Marco Rubio-a Reply to Professor
Ku, supra note 335.

362

H.R. 1191, Pub. L. 114-17.
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the agreement and did not limit its authorization to the president to only non-binding
commitments. 363 Under Iranian law, international agreements must be ratified by the
parliament and upon ratification it becomes part of the domestic law.

364

The Iranian

parliament also ratified the JCPOA in October of 2015.365

5. Sanctions and Iran Nuclear Deal

In the Iran case, the Nuclear Deal has been cherished as a successful case of economic
sanctions that brought a “rogue state” to the serious negotiation talks. 366 It is hard to
measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Some studies find them to be an
effective way of changing the behavior of states, if properly implemented. 367 Some do

363

Congressionally authorized executive agreements have provided the basis for 90 percent of the
United States’ international obligations, Ackerman & Golove, Can the Next President Repudiate
Obama’s Iran Agreement?, supra note 335.

364

The Iranian Constitution states: “International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must
be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.” QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN
[THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 77.

365

Iranian Parliament Ratifies Outlines of JCPOA, Tehran Times, October 12, 2015, available at
http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/250028/Iranian-parliament-ratifies-outlines-of-JCPOA

366.

Jim Sciutto, Senators Propose New Iran Sanctions Bill: White House Opposed, C.N.N., (Dec.
19th, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/19/politics/iran-sanctions-senate/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2014). For instance Robert Mendez, a New Jersey Democrat Senator, declared “current sanctions
brought Iran to the negotiating table.” That was the reasoning behind his bi-partisan proposal to
step up the level of pressure on Iran through enacting further economic sanctions. See id.

367

See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2009).
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not.368 Iran’s case is no exception. It is very hard to gauge the effectiveness of economic
sanctions in Iran’s case.
Yet, recent rhetoric has centered on the fact that economic sanctions have been working
and that the change in Iran’s behavior came as a result of crippling economic sanctions.
However, before one can conclude such a general statement, it is helpful to look at the
following facts:
1. Sanctions showed their strongest impact from 2010 onwards. A web of economic
sanctions imposed by the UN, the US and the EU aimed to strangle the Iranian economy,
provoked social unrest and halted the Iranian Government’s enrichment activity. 369 The
Iranian economy suffered tremendously as a result of sanctions. The Rial, the Iranian
currency, lost almost half of its value.370 The sale of oil also dropped from 2.5 million
barrels per day in 2011 to 1 million barrels per day in 2013. 371 Yet, there is little evidence
showing that the Iranian government suffered as result of these sanctions. 372 As a Rentier

368

See generally ERNEST H. PREEG, FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD WITH SANCTIONS: UNILATERAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST (1999).

369

Nader Habibi, The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Sanctions, in IRAN AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: PETRO POPULISM, ISLAM AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 172, 172-174 (Parvin Alizadeh &
Hassan Hakimian, eds., 2014).

370.

Steven Plaut, The Collapse of Iran’s Rial, GATESTONE INSTITUTE, (Feb 21, 2013, 5:00 AM), http:
//.gatestoneinstitute.org/3597/iran-rial-collpase.

371.

See Sanctions, IRAN M ATTERS: BEST ANALYSIS AND FACTS ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR
CHALLENGE
FROM
HARVARD’S
BELFER
CENTER,
available
at
http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/sanctions (last visited, Mar. 3, 2014). (providing a concise
review of the impact of economic sanctions on Iran’s economy).

372.

See, e.g., Oren Dorell, Iran Nuclear Sanctions Hurt the Middle Class, not Guards, USA TODAY,
Nov. 17, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-11-17/iran-nuclearsanctions-backfire/51275666/1; Beheshteh Farshneshani, In Iran, Sanctions Hurt the Wrong
People N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/19/sanctionssuccesses-and-failures/in-iran-sanctions-hurt-the-wrong-people; Jamal Abdi & Trita Parsi,
Opinion: Sanctions Against Iran Hurt the People, Not the Regime, NEWSDAY, Aug. 5, 2012, http://
www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/sanctions-against-iran-hurt-the-people-not-the-regime-opinion1.3881126; Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi & Muhammad Sahimi, The Sanctions Aren’t Working,
FOREIGN POLICY, July 5, 2012, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/05/
the_sanctions_aren_t_working.
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State 373 , those with special privileges continued to import and export from a black
market, but this time even without any strong competitors from the Iranian domestic
market.
2. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, there have been several periods of social
unrest,374 the last of which followed the June 2009 election. 375 As far as analyses show,
none of these periods of social unrest had a strong economic motive behind it: the
Reformist Movement of 1997-2001 had political goals including promotion of
democracy, rule of law as well as establishing a robust civil society. 376 During student
protests in 1999, the main request was political in nature too, i.e. request for freedom. 377
In 2009, the crowd gathered in the streets because of their objection to the result of the

373. “Rentier States are defined here as those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial mounts
[sic] of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals,
concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country…a moment’s
reflection will reveal that oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting countries
can also be external rents…the governments of the oil exporting countries in the Middle East
benefit from differential and monopolistic rents that arise from higher productivity of the Middle
Eastern oilfields and price fixing practices of the oil companies.” Hossein Mahdavi, The Patterns
and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 428,
428-29 (M.A. Cook ed. 1970) (footnote omitted).
374.

See generally Simin Fadaee, Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society
(2012).

375.

See e.g. Nazila Fathi & Michael Slackman, Iran Stepping Up Effort to Quell Election Protest,
NYTIMES,
Jun.
24,
2009
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html?_r=0; Timeline: Iran’s Post Eleciton Protests,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Jun. 11, 2010 available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/533d966e-755a-11dfa7e2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GN4X6ujT.

376.

MAJID MOHAMMADI, JUDICIAL REFORM AND REORGANIZATION
BUILDING, MODERNIZATION AND ISLAMICIZATION 184 (2008).

377

Student
Protests
Shake
Iran’s
Government,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/world/student-protests-shake-iran-s-government.html.
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378

However, no major social unrest has been reported since the 2010

implementation of “crippling sanctions.” 379
3. Economic sanctions also seem to be ineffective in halting nuclear enrichment activity
of the Iranian Government. With 190 centrifuges before the sanctions, Iran extended its
program to 19000 centrifuges following the 2010 sanctions. 380 It seems that the sanctions
came nowhere close to crippling the enrichment activity of the Iranian government.
4. Long before the recent stringent sanctions, Western countries had a better deal with
Iran in 2003: total suspension of enrichment activity, not for 6 months but indefinitely
(see Tehran Declaration). 381 There was no discussion of the “right to enrichment” either.
It was simply a better deal from the Western countries’ perspective.382 After almost 10
years, with crippling sanctions in place, Iran is not suspending its entire enrichment, 383

378.

Robert F. Worth & Nazila Fathi, Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote, N.Y.
TIMES,
June
13,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/
world/middleeast/14iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

379.

Akbar Ganji, US Crippling Sanctions Against Iran: A New Wave of Anti-Americanism (Part I),
HUFFINGTON POST, Sep. 3, 2013, http://.huffingtonpost.com/akbar-ganji/us-crippling-sanctions_b_3860933.html.

380.

See Iran’s Nuclear Timetable, IRAN W ATCH: TRACKING IRAN’S UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPON
CAPABILITIES, Feb. 21, 2014 available at http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articlesreports/irans-nuclear-timetable (last visited, Mar. 3, 2014) (providing a quick overview of progress
of Iran’s nuclear program).

381.

See Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers, INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC
ENERGY
AGENCY,
Oct.
21,
2003,
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml (last visited, Mar.
3, 2014). In 2003, a nuclear agreement reached between Iran and three European countries, i.e.
England, France and Germany. In a trip to Tehran they signed a deal with Iran in which Iran
pledged to suspend its nuclear enrichment, which it did. Id.

382.

See Trita Parsi, No, Sanctions Didn’t Force Iran to Make a Deal , FOREIGN POLICY, May 14,
2014,
available
at
http://.foreignpolicy.com/articles//05/14
/sanctions__not_force__to_make____enrichment.

383.

Id.
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and also in one reading, its “right to enrichment” is actually implicitly recognized. 384
After all, the comprehensive deal-to-come should “involve[] a mutually defined
(uranium) enrichment program.”385
The nuclear deal, however, was successful partly because of the way constitutionalism in
Iran is structured. The presidents need to gain the soft power by having a peaceful and
cooperative relationship with other countries. Presidents do not enjoy having access to
armed forces. Further, international deals such as the JCPOA create a normative structure
around which presidents can project their power in domestic Iranian politics. Due to this
important factor, engagement and international commitments play an important role in
creating balance within Iranian politics and the Iranian constitution.

Further, the via media approach, calling the JCPOA a political commitment with legal
consequences, 386 invites a fundamental inquiry: What are the characteristics of a binding
agreement if other than the fact that it would not be devoid of legal consequences? In
other words, in international law where no legislative and executive body exist, one
might conclude that instruments are ‘binding’ if they lead to legal consequences borne by

384.

Mark Fitzpatrick, Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Deal, THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
STRATEGIC STUDIES, (Feb. 3, 2014), http://.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2014-f13/e91c/theiranian-nuclear-deal-076e.

385

Iran
&
P5+1Joint
Plan
of
Action,
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf.

386

See also Dan Joyner, The Trump Presidency and the Iran Nuclear: Initial Though, EUR. J. OF
INT’L L. TALK, Nov. 17, 2016. (“some of the JCPOA’s commitments – a number of which have
already been implemented by the parties including by the U.N. Security Council itself – have legal
implications. Iran’s provisional application of the IAEA Additional Protocol, the U.N. Security
Council’s removal of its economic and other sanctions on Iran through Resolution 2231, and the
removal of unilateral economic sanctions under domestic law by the U.S. and the European Union,
have all already occurred as of Implementation Day, as stipulated in the JCPOA.”)

137

Preamble

available

at

the parties. Further, if any commitments set forth in the JCPOA are deemed to be part of
the respective state’s international obligation, then “it is a principle of international law
that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an
adequate form.”387
A Different International Law
Undoubtedly, world affairs and international law have changed significantly since the
Cold War era, and three developments are particularly relevant here. First, international
law has shifted course from consent-based dispute resolution toward a more compulsory
framework.388 Generally speaking, states are bound by their agreements and are liable for
the fulfillment of an obligation only if they objectively consent to undertake that
obligation. As case law suggests, however, international courts and tribunals have
increasingly found ways to extend their jurisdiction even without the explicit consent of
states. The Oil Platform Case389 before the International Court of Justice and the Loewen
Case before a NAFTA 390 tribunal serve as good examples in which the tribunals
proceeded to adjudicate the matters even though they did not find jurisdiction proper. 391

387

Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, P.C.I.J, Series A, No. 921, 23, July 26, 1927.

388

W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 208 (2012)

389

Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 12 December 1996. Paragraph 52. .

390

The Loewen Group, INC and Raymond L Loewen v. United States of America, Case No. ARB
(AF)/98/3, award. June 23, 2006. The Tribunal assessed the criteria of exhaustion of local
remedies (paragraph 172-217) even though it did not find jurisdiction to hear the case (paragraph
240).

391

See id. at 211-12.
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Another pivotal development is the increase of international fora and regimes, which has
led to a highly fragmented system of law at the international level. 392 This means that a
“political commitment” in an arms deal might be construed differently in other contexts,
such as investment law or international human rights.
Finally, a shift is noticeable in the principal method of interpretation partly as a result of
expansion of international investment dispute resolutions. 393 In international law, the
dominant method of interpretation, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 394 is textualist and formalistic. However, in recent years, the policy-based
approach seems to have gained traction. 395 When applying the policy-based approach,
international tribunals consider the parties’ stakes as well as the social and systemic
consequences of their decisions, among other factors. 396 More so than ever before, states
that intend to enter political commitments rather than binding agreements may face
tribunals that construe their pledge as legally binding.

392

See generally Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Int’l Law
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).

393

TODD WEILER, THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 29 (2013) (“These
developments may well portend a pragmatic shift in international law.”)

394

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

395

WEILER, supra note 393; REISMAN, supra note 388 at 193-194.

396

Reisman supra note 388at 183-184. See also Weiler, supra note 40, at 34-39. For a criticism of
adopting an interpretation based on systemic implications, see Michael Reisman, ‘Case Specific
Mandates’ versus ‘Systemic Implications’: How Should Investment Tribunals Decide? The
Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 23 ARB. INT’L 131, 131-132 (2013).
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Conclusion
Constitutions are designed to create metanorms to govern the polity. As Alex Stone
Sweet stated:
“[A] constitution denotes a body of metanorms, rules that specify how legal norms are to
be produced, applied, and interpreted. Metanorms are thus not only higher-order but
prior, organic norms—they constitute a polity. Metanorms enhance the legitimacy of
legal norms (and therefore social legitimacy) not unlike the way higher degrees of clarity
enhance the legitimacy of norms generally: metanorms make more transparent the
processes by which legal norms are produced, compliance is monitored, and infractions
punished. Thus, metanorms fix the rules of the game, as a means of investing lower-order
norms with authority (legitimacy). To the extent that these rules are expected to be longlived, or quasi-permanent, the establishment of metanorms is an institutionalization of the
social interest.”397
Hence, Iranian presidents, especially in the post-establishment era resorted to creating the
metanorms by acceding to international regimes. In other words, the presidents, in the
post-establishment era, have defined their presidency partly or wholly by their approach
to international commitments and international law. This was an endeavor to create
metanorm domestically needed to balance powers.

397

Alex Stone Sweet, What is a Supranational Constitution?: An Essay in International Relations
Theory, 56.3 THE REV. OF POLITICS 441, 444 (1994).(emaphsis original)
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As shown in the discussion above, none of the proponents and opponents during the
constitutional deliberation took the view that popular vote should categorically be
rejected. Although there are considerable disagreements among the representatives, it is
important to note that even proponents of Guardianship of a Jurist discussion did not
view it or envision it as a replacement for popular governance. For some of them this
principle was the framework to protect the ‘excesses’ of popular voting. For others, the
fact that the leader itself would be appointed (indirectly) by popular vote signified that it
was not in contradiction with the principle of popular vote.
In the Khomeini era, despite Iran’s contentious foreign policies, in cases where the
tension could escalate into conflict, Iran opted for resolution of disputes through
international law. This could be partly due to external pressure. Yet, it is important to
note that Iran remained compliant with the regimes to which it voluntarily subscribed.
In post-Khomeini Iran, international relations and international law played an
instrumental role in balancing power and creating norms that were needed for such
balance in domestic politics. In this phase, the normative framework, resulting from the
evolution of constitutionalism, along with international commitments created a normative
structure by which presidents were viewed as pro-cooperation while the supreme leader
was viewed as a proponent of autarky. This is partly or wholly due to the structure of the
Iranian constitution and the deficiency created in constitution, which needed to be filled
with engagement with international law.
In addition, the geo-culture of Iranian society, borrowed from three main sources i.e. preIslamic Iran, Shiite, and Western influence has proven to be quite legalistic in approach.
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